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ABSTRACT 
IVO T. DIMITROV: Spain’s Historical Memory Law: A Study of Successful Historical 
Reconciliation 
(Under the direction of Dr. John D. Stephens) 
I explore the Historical Memory Law (Ley 52/2007) as a successful model of 
historical reconciliation. I argue that the HML can be conceived as a renewed source of 
legitimacy for the Spanish state and as a progressive model of reconciliation, applicable to 
democratizing countries. First, I address how the pacted transition has affected reparation and 
rehabilitation efforts. Second, I respond to the critics by extensively analyzing the legal 
framework and victim compensations from the onset of the Transition. Autonomous division 
of power and the legacy of the pacted transition emerge as limiting factors in HML 
implementation. Thirdly, I identify left-leaning regional parties as the key actor in the 
political effort and propose a comprehensive four-stage model that maps out the 
reconciliation effort (negation, amnesia, accommodation, reconciliation). I conclude that 
historical reconciliation will deal with memory recuperation (exhumations, symbols removal, 
sentences annulment) and depend on a new generation of post-Transition Spaniards. 
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Introduction 
 
 In this thesis, I argue that the Historical Memory Law is successful legislation, in 
intent and application, conceived as a renewed source of legitimacy for the democratic 
Spanish state. Furthermore, it can be studied as a progressive model of historical 
reconciliation that is applicable to democratizing countries. 
 In Chapter 2, I examine the lasting impact of the dictatorship on the reconciliation 
agenda. I show how the prolonged presence of Francoism and the desire to safeguard the 
democratic transition limited reconciliation to the arena of economic reparations, in the 
form of pensions. Yet, after periods of memory negation, amnesia, and accommodation, 
the HML defined a public turn to moral reparation and public rejection of the fascist past. 
This reflected PSOE’s newfound commitment to respect the rights of victims and to 
reinvigorate citizen support for state institutions by prioritizing autonomous rule of law, 
democratic values and social justice. 
 In Chapter 3, I respond to the major critics of the legislation. By analyzing the 
legal framework and government initiatives, I conclude that the HML is the most 
comprehensive historical reconciliation effort in Spain and I demonstrate how gradualism 
(‘the ratchet effect’) has sequentially expanded the scope and level of benefits. I interpret 
the shortcoming of the legislation (annulment of Francoist sentences, privatized 
exhumations, removal of fascist symbols) as the unreached stages of a process that is 
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limited by autonomous divisions of power and the desire to safeguard the sanctity of the 
pacted transition. 
 In Chapter 4, I turn my attention to the forces and actors that have pushed the 
reconciliation effort. Rather than amnesia and absent transitional justice, I credit Spain’s 
functioning democracy on the specialization of societal forces that adopted unique roles 
to right the injustice of the old regime. In the legislature, regional left-leaning parties 
were the force behind economic reparations and memory recuperation. Researchers, 
victims’ associations and international actors exposed the crimes of the regime and 
pressured PP and PSOE to adopt economic and moral reparation measures. Here, I offer a 
sequential model of the four stages of reconciliation that maps out the effort since the 
transition (see Figure 2). 
 In conclusion, I reiterate my support for the HML as an effort that honors victims 
and aims to eliminate the vestiges of Francoism in the modern Spanish state. Since its 
measures are legally-binding and institutionally entrenched, I believe that a new 
generation of Spaniards, guided by a democratic and European cosmopolitan 
consciousness, will adopt an even more critical stance towards the dictatorship.
 3
 
 
 
Chapter II: 
Historical reconciliation: function, criteria, and approaches 
  
 Spanish efforts to compensate victims, advance memory recuperation and 
eliminate the vestiges of fascism have always been influenced by the pacted transition. In 
this section, I examine how the Francoist legacy has socially structured historical 
reconciliation since the Civil War (see Chapter IV.B for legislative analysis). 
Secondarily, I briefly outline standards of international jurisprudence that can be used to 
evaluate the reconciliation process. Lastly, I argue that the HML is a vehicle that bolsters, 
rather than competes, with the democratic legitimacy of the Spanish state and the 
Constitution: it affirms their values without being marred by the transitional compromises 
with the old regime. 
A) The function of memory and history in Spain 
 In modern Spain, memory has played an essential role as a source of institutional 
legitimacy in the construction of the state.1 After Franco’s victory, fascists aggressively 
sought to cleanse the social spaces of remembrance – schools, workplaces, homes and 
plazas – of the brief existence of the Second Republic.2 The regime legitimized itself and 
paved the way to the transition by portraying the republic as chaos and the Civil War as a 
                                                 
1
 For stages of memory analysis, Maestre (2003). 
2
 Sanz (2006). 
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fratricidal conflict. Consequently, the dictatorship was the architect of authoritarian 
stability defined by ‘25 years of peace’ and the parliamentary monarchy was equated 
with progress and prosperity.3 The negation of memory characterized the period 1936-
1977. Forced disappearances,4 summary arrests, torture and harassment relaxed in the 
1950s, but repression was a defining trait of the government until the end.5  Up to 
440,000 Republicans went into exile and as many spent time in prison or forced labor 
camps.6 An environment of overt discrimination curtailed education and professional 
opportunities for republicans and sympathizers. Conversely, reparation schemes, 
monuments, public holidays and rituals honored only Nationalists. Thus, “oppression, 
torture and labor camps were the most successful ways of enforcing the dictatorship”.7  
 During the politics of amnesia (1977-1981), the political class and Spanish society 
adopted a vow of silence in terms of the past, known as the pacto de olvido. The ruling 
elites eschewed any discussion on the abuses of the dictatorship. They approved an 
Amnesty Law that exempted from responsibility everyone who committed offenses of a 
political nature. It pardoned the repression of the regime, so that political prisoners could 
be released and the transition further consecrated.8 Concurrently, the UCD passed 
                                                 
3
 Valcárcel (2010). 
4
 The standard figure is 30,000, but some estimate up to 80,000. See, Maestre (2003, p. 102), who cites the 
work of Jesús Núñez Calvo and Luis Castro. For a glance at Franco’s treatment of the disappeared, see 
Decreto no67, de 11 de noviembre de 1936: “… a natural consequence of war is the disappearance of 
people, combatants or otherwise, victims of bombardments, fires or other such causes...” and the Orden de 
1 de mayo de1940 (BOE 9/5/1940) on “the exhumations and burials of corpses murdered by the reds.” 
5
 Aguilar (2001). 
6
 Preston (1990, pp. 40-43). 
7
 López and Hespanha (2008, p. 5). 
8
 Ley 46/1977 de 15 de octubre, de amnistía. 
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pension laws for republicans that provided economic reparation in exchange for moral 
recognition.9 There were no efforts to publicly affirm the continuity of the Second 
Republic. At his coronation, Juan Carlos swore loyalty to the principles of Franco’s 
National Movement. The flag retained the fascist motto (Una, Grande, Libre) and 
symbols (the yoke and arrows). Despite the adoption of the 1977 Constitution, which 
legitimized Republican democracy in the face of an illegal military uprising, the pacted 
transition demanded public silence in terms of history. 
 The unsuccessful coup on February 23, 1981 showed that the repressive past was 
not far behind and ushered in an accommodation period (1982-2002) in terms of 
memory. The political class avoided contentious debates on the dictatorship, but 
reformed institutions in order to join NATO and the EEC. It extended pension coverage 
for republicans, compensated banned unions and political parties, and returned 
confiscated Catalonian archives. It appeased both sides. In 1986, on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the uprising, Felipe Gonzáles’ government honored defenders of 
republican institutions as well as those “who, impelled by convictions other than those of 
democratic Spain, fought for a different society and to which many also sacrificed their 
lives.”10 Paradoxically, both fighters for and against the Second Republic were honored 
in order to be re-imagined as martyrs for the transition.  
 In contrast, academic researchers assumed the contentious task of exposing the 
abuses of the regime and recuperating historical memory. Their effort was so successful 
                                                 
9
 Decreto 670/1976, de 5 de marzo, regulates the pensions of invalids that cannot join the Cuerpo de 
Caballeros Mutilados; Ley 5/1979, de 18 de septiembre, on the recognition of pensions, medical-
pharmaceutical aid and social assistance for widows, children and heirs of victims of the Civil War; Ley 
35/1980, de 26 de junio, on pensions to republican ex-combatant invalids. 
10
 Pradera (2006). 
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that in 1996 Santos Juliá published a provocative article in which he denounced the 
“imagined pact of forgetting.” He insisted that “in the 20 years of democracy everyone 
has investigated whatever they wanted, benefitted from public funding to research and 
edit it, as well as abundant space in newspapers and periodicals to popularize it.”11 
Interest in reexamining history was also reflected by the high number of newspaper 
articles that dealt with memory, though the government did not prioritize any narrative. 
 By 2002, a period of historical reconciliation was approaching under pressure 
from victims’ associations and minority left parties. A Congress statement recognized the 
old regime’s repression, morally rehabilitated republican victims, and acknowledged IU 
demands for exhumations of gravesites.12 A substantial increase in motions identified 
various victims: the disappeared, the summarily-executed, exiles, forced laborers, 
children of war, and fallen democrats. Despite the extreme reluctance of the PP to engage 
in memory recuperation, the Historical Memory Law was adopted in 2007. It recognized 
Francoist repression, condemned the dictatorship, regulated symbolic spaces, promised 
state aid in exhumation efforts, granted citizenship to International Brigadiers, and 
established further reparation measures.  
 Nonetheless, the political class did not dare debate the legacy of Francoism, 
namely the pacted transition and the institutions born during it (monarchy, non-federal 
autonomy statues, etc). The government refused to annul illegitimate tribunal sentences, 
                                                 
11
 “En los 20 años que llevamos de democracia cada cual ha investigado lo que le ha venido en gana, ha 
contado con ayudas oficiales para hacerlo y ha disfrutado de financiación pública para editarlo y de 
generosísimos espacios en periódicos y revistas para darlo a conocer. Roza ya el límite de lo grotesco 
insistir en un fantasmagórico pacto de olvido como explicación de supuestas lagunas en la historiografía de 
la guerra civil”. See, Juliá (1996). For an extensive rebuttal, Maestre (2007). 
12
 Enmienda de modificación, A la mesa del Congreso de los Diputados, 19 de noviembre de 2002, Madrid. 
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to pressure the autonomies to remove fascist symbols, or to take full responsibility for the 
exhumation efforts. Instead, PSOE spokesman Ramón Jáuregui stated that the HML 
establishes “the right of all the citizens to recover their personal and familial memory” 
and asked whether this right should extend to only victims of franquismo or should 
include the Civil War.13 In recognizing the suffering of the other “side”, he noted, we 
strengthen the spirit of negotiated reconciliation, which is the base of transitional 
democracy.14 By rhetorically equating the factions and limiting the extent of the HML, 
this accommodation had one purpose: to safeguard the inviolable nature of the pacted 
transition, which could not be questioned for fear of destabilizing the foundational base 
of the democratic state.  
B. Criteria to judge reconciliation: remedies, knowledge, and justice 
 There are various transitional justice mechanisms that aid societies to “come to 
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve 
justice and achieve reconciliation.”15 These include criminal investigations and 
prosecutions; truth-seeking mechanisms; memorialization efforts; reparation for victims; 
guarantees of non-repetition; and institutional reform. Investigating the past in the 
aftermath of a repressive regime is a controversial process. The former elites are in a 
privileged position: without lustration, defenders of the old guard dominate the courts and 
state institutions.16 Victims are unaccustomed to contesting the endured abuses. 
                                                 
13
 “Pero si ese derecho se quiere extender a la Guerra Civil - y en mi opinión así debe ser - resulta obligado 
reconocerlo también a quienes sufrieron esas mismas circunstancias en el otro bando”. 
14
 Jáuregui (2006). 
15
 UN Secretary General Report, The role of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict 
societies, S/2004/616, August 23, 2004. 
16
 Kritz (1995, p. xxxvi). 
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Consequently, sympathizers can deny that human rights violations took place; minimize 
the allegations; justify the abuses in a narrative against a larger threat; or use institutions 
and transition pacts (e.g. amnesty laws) to prevent investigations. Therefore justice 
advocates often cite international jurisprudence to establish criteria for successful 
reconciliation and to pressure governments into compliance. 
 The first standard is the right to remedies.17 Essentially, these are material 
reparations. ‘Rehabilitation’ reinstates a person to their professional position, prior to the 
repression of the regime. ‘Reparation’ entails any measure that compensates the victim in 
the form of benefits, indemnities, or special payments. ‘Restitution’ is the devolution of 
confiscated property either to the legitimate owners, their descendants or the institution 
that owned it. Although money cannot make up for egregious suffering, remedies can 
bridge intra-national divides. If sufficient and timely, they may aid families to mediate 
the material aspect of their loss.18 More importantly, they serve as official recognition of 
the injury between the nation and the victims. Thirdly, the moral and financial burden on 
the state may prevent recurrences of such abuses.19 Lastly, payments reflect the legal 
acceptance of state culpability, which may incentivize more generous programs in the 
future. 
                                                 
17
 For definitions of rehabilitation, reparation and restitution, see Montero (2010, p. 85). 
18
 Kritz (1995, p. xxxvii). 
19
 This creates a double dilemma: (1) in penalizing the state, the remedies burden the successive 
democratizing government, rather than the perpetrators; and (2) if the remedies are substantial, they may 
create inflation and budgetary deficits, which may destabilize the government agenda and legitimize the 
reentry of old regime; or (3) if meager, the reparations may add insult to the injury suffered by victims. 
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 The second standard is the right to knowledge.20 Truth-seeking mechanisms were 
originally employed in criminal trials in order to map out the extent of past abuses and 
culpability. In models of transitional justice, like Spain’s, where penalization is not the 
central focus, they serve a triple function. Firstly, it emphasizes that people have the right 
to know what occurred during the regime; victims must know why they suffered abuse; 
and both must remember it to battle against revisionism (prin. 2-5). Secondly, 
commissions must uncover and disseminate the repressed truth (prin. 6-13). Lastly, 
archives must be preserved and made available to the public to determine the violations 
of civil rights (prin. 14-18). Such recognition in the public space has a therapeutic role by 
incorporating the surreal reality of the persecuted into the common heritage of the nation. 
Also, it battles state monopoly on information (and power) by converting archives into 
public depositories of knowledge. 
 The third standard is the right to justice, based on investigations and prosecutions. 
Firstly, states must create the judicial framework necessary to report, investigate and 
judge cases of violations of human rights in a “timely, exhaustive, independent and 
impartial” manner.21 Secondly, the government must prosecute and punish crimes against 
humanity, such as genocide, torture, extrajudicial executions, and forced 
disappearances.22 Justice advocates battle against impunity (the exemption of perpetrators 
                                                 
20
 E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 of the Commission on Human Rights on February 08, 2005. “Updated set of 
principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity.” 
21
 SEAI (2005, p. 40). 
22
 See Isa (2006, p. 44). Also, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(1948), which Spain acceded on Sept. 13, 1968. Paragraph 6 states: “persons charged with genocide … 
shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by 
such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.” The Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984), which Spain signed on Feb. 4 1985 and 
ratified on Oct. 21, 1987, demands the trial and or extradition for trial of accused (articles 4 and 7). 
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of violations from punishment) for legal, reparation and ethical reasons. Legally, 
impunity weakens the assurances of civil rights: if citizen protection and the social 
contract are violated without consequence, few will trust in them. Without prosecutions, 
one cannot deliver punishment that is deserved, deter future offenses or incapacitate 
dangerous criminals. From a reparation viewpoint, impunity is a roadblock because it 
robs victims of the ability to make legal demands against a guilty party. Not least of all, 
impunity may aggravate victims’ suffering by denying them justice and recognition of 
their hardships. Collectively, these theoretical standards can act as a benchmark for 
successful reconciliation in societies transitioning from repressive regimes. 
C. The Law as a source of renewed legitimacy 
 When the Memory Law was debated, the Popular Party denounced it strongly:  
to legislate so-called historical memory is a big mistake…this project is a torpedo aimed at the 
waterline of our political system… this law is misleading and hypocritical because it disguises 
itself as an initiative of harmony when in reality it is nothing more than a step towards a rupture 
with the coexistence pact between Spaniards, embodied in the transition and the 
Constitution…Mr. Rodríguez Zapatero breaks the pact, betrays this pact, and betrays the position 
of the PSOE during the last 25 years.23 
 
While the speech of the conservatives attacked the legal, social, and ethical dimensions of 
the law, their insistence that it was a serious threat to the Constitution and cohesion 
between Spaniards was most striking. Indeed, a similar motion denouncing Franco had 
passed in 2002 when the conservatives were in power,24 along with initiatives for moral 
                                                 
23
 BOE, núm. 222, de 14 de diciembre de 2006. Manuel Atencia Robledo: “legislar la llamada memoria 
histórica – constituye un gran error. Este proyecto supone un torpedo en la línea de flotación de nuestro 
régimen político (11259)… esta ley es falsaria e hipócrita, porque se disfraza de iniciativa de concordia lo 
que en realidad no es sino un paso más en la estrategia de ruptura del gran pacto de convivencia entre los 
españoles que fue la transición y la Constitución (11260) … el señor Rodríguez Zapatero rompe el pacto, 
traiciona aquel pacto, traiciona la posición del PSOE durante 25 años”. 
24
 BOE, núm. 448, de 29 de noviembre de 2002. 
  11
acknowledgement (IU),25 moral reparation (PSOE),26 exiles acknowledgement (PSOE),27 
exhumations (IU),28 and dignity for relatives of executed (joint).29 Why then did PP 
frame the Historical Memory Law as a challenge to the legal and social institutions that 
underpinned Spanish democracy? More importantly, what impelled PSOE to adopt such 
legislation on historical memory? 
 Firstly, an important distinction is the legal status of the adopted measures. The 
PP document was passed with all political parties voting in favor. Its classification 
(proposición no de ley) had two implications: it was a motion proposed by the legislature 
and it had no legal binding power.30 It was just under two pages with four articles, 
reiterating the need for societal amnesty and moral acknowledgement of the victims of 
violence. The HML, on the other hand, is a legally-binding law of over seven pages with 
31 articles that established an overarching program of measures that engaged state, 
regional and local governments. Unlike the PP motion, Law 52/2007 required much 
negotiation31 and was blocked by the conservatives and the ERC.32 Thus, while the 
                                                 
25
 BOCG, núm. 376, de 24 de junio de 2002. 
26
 BOCG, núm. 412, de 30 de septiembre de 2002. 
27
 BOCG, núm. 412, de 30 de septiembre de 2002. 
28
 BOCG, núm. 423, de 22 de octubre de 2002. 
29
 BOCG, núm. 444, de 25 de noviembre de 2002. 
30
 The term proposición deals with legislative initiative, i.e. with who proposes a draft to be passed by the 
Parliament. If it is the government (via executive power) it is called a proyecto or if by Members of 
Parliament (even from the opposition parties), it is called proposición. The term no de ley has to do with the 
content of the draft. The motion proponed by Members of Parliament can refer to a legislative enactment 
(proposición de ley) or to something that is not meant to be legally binding, if passed (proposición no de 
ley). 
31
 Díez and Cué (2007). 
32
 EFE (2007). 
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measures dealt with a similar topic, the PP initiative was merely symbolic; reflected the 
minimum consensus of the Congress; and did not purport to have a noticeable effect on 
administrations or the public space. 
 Secondly, the Memory Law is a vehicle to stabilize and reinvigorate Spanish 
patriotism and coexistence (convivencia). Many factors complicate the expression of 
Spanish patriotism. The country is a multinational state;33 the civil war had a polarizing 
effect on society; and the most injurious effect was the monopolization and abuse of 
patriotism discourse under Franco. Nonetheless, Spaniards are patriotic.34 They identify 
closely with each other35 and peripheral nationalism is not strongly divisive.36 As a result, 
most politicians have adopted ‘constitutional patriotism’ to unite citizens and to avoid 
complications with expressing national pride.37 For the right, this means associations with 
Franco and for the left, the need to protect alliances with autonomies.  
 This approach is acceptable because the Constitution binds legitimately through 
consensus. It prizes justice and is a ratification mechanism that allows the state to self-
                                                 
33
 For a superb analysis on plurality and its effect on Spanish nationalism, see Lacasta-Zabalza (1998). 
34
 In a 2000 survey, 65% of participants saw themselves as Spaniards, first and foremost, and as Europeans; 
7% saw themselves as Europeans and then as Spaniards; and only 20% identified as only Spaniards. See, 
Eurobarometer (2000). 
35
 90% of Spaniards feel very close (bastante cercano o muy cercano) to their fellow countrymen. This is a 
bit higher than the percentage that feel close to their autonomous community (87%) and close to that of 
those who identify with their home city (92%). Translated from Spanish, Jiménez (2004). 
36
 “Although Basque and Catalan nationalist discourses strive to problematize the compatibility of regional 
identity (nationalist) and national (Spanish), the Basques and Catalans do not have difficulty identifying as 
Spaniards. According to data from the survey conducted for this research, 93 percent of Catalans feel close 
to the rest of Spanish countrymen, while 88 percent feel equally close to their region and the nation. In 
regards to the Basque people, 81 percent of Basques feel close to the Basque Country and Spain.” 
Translated from Spanish, Jiménez (2004, p. 3). 
37
 The authors propose a more critical interpretation: “on the other hand, the left displays such an instinctive 
negative reaction to concepts such as patriotism and nationalism that it is unable to find a natural way of 
dealing with these questions.” Aguilar and Humlebæk (2002, p. 141). 
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reinforce in the face of growing EU pressures for internationalization and peripheral 
nationalism. Yet to be embraced as a binding institution, the Constitution must be seen as 
legitimate. This relies on the perceptions of its contents and origins, and is made more 
difficult by the diversity of the Spanish state. Consequently, “history has become the 
preferred terrain for disputes on constitutional legitimacy and national pluralisms have 
fractured the past into the common history of Spaniards and the unique ones of the 
constituent nations.”38  
 Since there was no clear break with Franco’s regime, but gradual reform, the 
transition pact and the Constitution risk being tainted by a discredited regime. The 
Memory Law seeks to preserve these accords by disassociating them from a narrative that 
overemphasizes a compromise with Spain’s anti-democratic legacy. It replants them into 
the domain of inviolable citizen’s rights and the supremacy of democracy. It portrays the 
modern Spanish state as the progressive antithesis of the Civil War and the Dictatorship. 
The HML approach is hostile only to the legacy and memory of franquismo. Rather than 
legislate the past, it establishes the direction of the state: rule of law, victim remembrance 
and social justice – values that resonate with a Spanish public for whom the pre-transition 
past plays a diminishing role. 
 Thirdly, the HML is strongly motivated by the political calculus of the socialists. 
On the one hand, it allows them to ‘catch up’ by assuming a more authoritative position 
on the past after their prolonged period of accommodation. On the other hand, it is a 
response to the PP framing of the discourse on memory, which prioritizes Civil War 
victims and sanctifies the transition but turns a blind eye to the illegal coup, the 
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 Amado (2008, p. 52). 
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dictatorship and the executioners. This explains the 1999 PSOE campaign to condemn 
“the fascist military coup against republican legality.”39 Additionally, such efforts build 
goodwill with autonomies, the most vocal of which is Catalonia, by prioritizing them in 
the historical narrative. Though less recognized, it also serves to decrease the legitimating 
discourse of the Catalan independence movement, which used the historical oppression 
rhetoric as a rallying point (before it switched its focus to taxation).40 
 In sum, the Historical Memory Law is the product of the gradual evolution of 
Spanish society and the maturation of democratic identity. It is based on international 
legal standards in order to signal that the modern Spanish state prioritizes democratic and 
human rights. The initiative is ideologically-driven, but it is not an example of destructive 
historical revisionism. Rather, it is a response to the demand of autonomies for a fairer 
reflection of history and the need of the state to meet its obligations to victims of 
Francoist repression. It strengthens the legitimacy of political and legal institutions by 
conceptually distancing the state from its pact with the old regime. 
 
                                                 
39
 On the political use of memory, Maestre (2003, pp. 116-125). 
40
 The “Espanya ens costa 60 milions d'euro cada dia!” (Spain will cost 60 million euro every day) and 
“Bye bye Spain - Adeu Espanya” campaigns featured prominently in public spaces in Barcelona in 2010. 
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Chapter III: 
The significance of Law 52/2007 
 
 Since its inception in 2006, major political players, Amnesty International, 
victims associations, and legal scholars have attacked the Historical Memory Law as 
insufficient, anti-constitutional or irrelevant. These reactions are puzzling since the critics 
represent both sides of the political spectrum and because they are often the main 
beneficiaries of the legislation. By contrast, I defend the Law as a worthwhile product in 
the Spanish context and as a model that can be applied to democratizing societies with 
past repressive regimes. In this section, I show that gradualism (the ‘ratchet effect’) has 
directed the evolution of Spanish historical reconciliation legislation.1 Progress was 
initially slow and limited, but has moved in one direction: toward expansion of the scope 
and remuneration of benefits (see Appxs. A, E). Secondarily, I argue that the major 
shortcomings of the HML - privatized exhumations, annulment of execution sentences, 
and Francoist symbols removal - can be explained as the yet unreached final stages of a 
process that challenges the pact of forgetting (pacto de olvido), which was the 
foundational base of the transition. 
[FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                 
1
 The ‘ratchet effect’ refers to a mechanism where path dependence operates. Once a policy has been 
adopted, and its benefits recognized by the public, its constituency expands and it is very difficult for 
successive governments to reduce or eliminate it. Huber and Stephens (2001, pp. 322, 334) use the concept 
in analyzing the rapid growth of support for welfare state policies after their introduction. 
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A) Does the HML matter? Responses to the critics 
 Amnesty International has consistently criticized Spain’s historical reconciliation 
efforts for not meeting its international obligations. In 2005, the organization accused the 
state of ignoring human rights abuses in regards to forced disappearances and egregious 
crimes such as rape, military tribunal executions and civil rights infringements.2 It 
charged that Spain does not provide victims with economic reparations or access to 
archives and has neither investigated nor prosecuted crimes against human rights. 
Therefore, it had not respected the rights to remedies, knowledge and justice set out by 
the UN Human Rights Commission. In 2008, Amnesty reiterated these failures in an 
article titled “One year after the ‘Historical Memory Law’ the victims of the Civil War 
and Franquismo have little to celebrate.”3 It demanded that the judiciary advance truth-
finding efforts and prevent the destruction of evidence. It insisted that the Attorney 
General (el Ministerio Fiscal) allow victims to view their records, bring lawsuits and seek 
prosecution for crimes perpetrated during the Civil War and the Dictatorship. Lastly, the 
human rights organization urged Spain to collaborate with the UN Working Group on 
Forced and Involuntary Disappearances, as well as to establish an expert-led truth 
commission.4 
 Refuting this criticism of inaction is useful for two reasons: firstly, it shows that 
the HML is the most comprehensive historical reconciliation effort in Spain. Secondly, it 
underscores the progressive pathway of the legislation. One of the major flaws of the 
                                                 
2
 SEAI (2005: pp. 9, 25, 53). 
3
 Translated from Spanish, SEAI (2008). 
4
 SEAI (2005, p. 61). 
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Amnesty critique is its overreliance on broad international norms. Whereas the 
Commission on Human Rights has consistently stressed standards for restitution, 
compensation, and rehabilitation, these have always been articulated as signposts, rather 
than concrete benchmarks. As guiding principles, the documents impel the state to act, 
but do not specify how it should act. Whereas autonomies like Navarra, Cataluña and 
Andalucía were originally hailed as pioneers in the reparation efforts, the measures of the 
central administration compare favorably and are complimentary in nature.5 
  Moreover, calls for punishment of human rights abuses ignore the reality of 
Spanish jurisprudence. The Amnesty Law of 1977 prohibits the retroactive prosecution of 
crimes on a political basis.6 Despite the insistence of international resolutions that human 
rights abuses cannot be amnestied, there is no political will to reopen that chapter of the 
past. Indeed, the opposite may be true: the internationally famous judge Baltasar Garzón 
was indicted on charges of abusing his power when he launched an investigation on 
executions and disappearances.7 Regardless, those who were “maximally responsible” for 
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 Ley 4/1990, de 29 de junio, allowed citizens who had been imprisoned for three years to receive a one-
time compensation.  Since only 60,479 of 103,000 applications met the conditions, the autonomies set up 
their own compensation schemes: Andalucía (Decreto 1/2001, de 9 de enero; Decreto 333/2003, de 9 de 
diciembre; Decreto 35/2006, de 21 de febrero); Aragón (Decreto 100/2000, de 16 de mayo); Asturias 
(Decreto 22/1999, de 29 de abril; Decreto 21/2000, de 2 de marzo); Canarias (Ley 9/2002, de 21 de 
octubre); Cantabria (Decreto 77/2002, de 28 de junio; Decreto 44/2002, de 22 de mayo); Castilla La 
Mancha (Decreto 31/2002, de 26 de febrero; Decreto 9/2004, de 3 de febrero); Castilla y León (Decreto 
171/2001, de 14 de junio; Decreto 115/2003, de 2 de octubre; Acuerdo 7/2003, de 16 de enero); Cataluña 
(Decreto 288/2000, de 31 de agosto; Decreto 330/2002, de 3 de diciembre); Las Islas Baleares (Orden de la 
Consejería de la Presidencia de 27 de diciembre de 2001); La Rioja (Orden de la Consejería de la Hacienda 
y Empleo de 13 de febrero de 2005); Madrid (Decreto 39/1999, de 11 de marzo; Decreto 47/2000, de 23 de 
marzo; Orden 981/2000, de 3 de abril); Murcia (Decreto 81/2004, de 23 de julio); Navarra (Decreto 
75/1995, de 20 de marzo); el País Vasco (Decreto 280/2002, de 19 de noviembre; Decreto 75/2004, de 4 de 
mayo; Decreto 22/2006, de 14 de febrero); Valencia (Decreto 210/2005, de 23 de diciembre). 
6
 Other government acts have complemented Amnesty Law 46/1977, among which are the Real Decreto 
2940/1975, de 25 de noviembre, the Orden Ministerial de 5 de diciembre de 1975, the Real Decreto-Ley 
10/1976, de 30 de julio, de Amnistía  
7
 Minder (2010). 
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these crimes are now deceased.8 The Spanish state does comply with most international 
norms. Yet, competing values and institutional arrangements that serve as the cornerstone 
of the pacted transition limit the implementation of principles advanced by the 
Commission on Human Rights. 
 Most importantly, there has been a consistent effort to provide greater protection 
for victims (see Appx. A, Tables 1-6). Such initiatives have recognized economic rights, 
retroactively rewarded public service, extended healthcare benefits, returned property to 
political parties and aided former republican military and civilian personnel, victims of 
the war and repression, as well as their families. The first of these measures benefitted 
republican members of the military and public order at the very onset of the transition.9 
During the first legislature (1979-82) measures targeted republican ex-combatants by 
retroactively granting pension rights,10 whereas some families of victims of the Civil War 
also received pension, pharmaceutical and social assistance.11 During the second 
legislature (1982-86), the remedies were expanded anew and the Social Security 
administration began to count time spent in prison for political reasons as working 
years.12 Although no new legislation was adopted by the next four legislatures (1986-96), 
the state approved certain motions to promote historical reconciliation. These included 
the return of Catalonian archives, symbolic recognition of fallen republicans like Manuel 
                                                 
8
 For a sample list of these Falangists, Álvarez (2008, p. 6). 
9
 Real Decreto-Ley 6/1978, de 6 de marzo; Real Decreto-Ley 43/1978, de 21 de diciembre. 
10
 Ley 5/1979, de 18 de septiembre. Ley 10/1980, de 14 de marzo (military personnel during the civil war); 
Ley 35/1980, de 26 de junio (ex-combatant republican invalids); Ley 6/1982, de 29 de marzo (civilian 
invalids of the war). 
11
 The laws on the state budget (Leyes de Presupuestos Generales del Estado) have regulated these benefits 
since 1981: Ley 5/1979, Ley 35/1980 and Ley 6/1982. 
12
 Respectively, Ley 371984, de 22 de octubre, and Ley 18/1984, de 8 de junio. 
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Azaña, restitution of property, granting citizenship to International Brigadiers, and 
recognizing the status of war exiles. 
 The record reflects the significance of these initiatives. There was a gradual 
granting of pensions to civil servants, military members, and invalids that would cover up 
to 513,000 people (see Appx. D, Tables 2, 3). By 2005, professional military were paid 
€2,508 million; non-professional military received €7,113 million; the relatives of 
110,000 deceased or disappeared victims were granted €3,345 million; and invalid 
pensions amounted to €3,000 million.13 €396 million were awarded for prison time for 
political reasons. In sum, more than €16.361 billion have been paid to compensate 
republican victims. This reparation effort has been complemented by pensions for 
amnestied public functionaries, as well as compensations of trade unions14 and 
Catalonian, Basque and left parties.15 
 In terms of archives, Amnesty and researchers incorrectly charge that there has 
been widespread destruction and deliberate roadblocks to accessing documents.16 A 
comprehensive study by the 2004 Interministerial Commission found that there is an 
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 Comisión Interministerial (2006, pp. 36-57). 
14
 The UGT trade union had 39 properties returned and received €24,905,941 in compensation for 492 
properties. The CNT, a confederation of anarcho-syndicalist labor unions, received 7 properties and 
€1,490,510 in compensation for 38 properties.  Comisión Interministerial (2006, p. 62). 
15
 Political parties received €6,676,030 in economic compensations through administrative channels and 
€21,163,105 in economic remedies through judicial channels in the period 2002-2004. For a detailed 
breakdown of the restitution for political parties, see “Restituciones y compensaciones efectuadas en la vía 
administrativa por acuerdo de consejo de ministros” and “Compensaciones económicas otorgadas a los 
partídos politicos en vía jurisdiccional”. Comisión Interministerial (2006, pp. 65, 67). 
16
 A 2005 Council of Europe report also reiterates these charges. In point 79 of “Dismantlement of 
Francoism,” it states: “convoys of trucks removed the ‘judicial’ records of the repression. As well as 
deliberate destruction of archives, there were ‘inadvertent’ losses when some town councils sold their 
archives by the ton as waste paper for recycling. Despite these losses during those crucial twenty years, 
enough has survived to allow for a reconstruction.” See, Brincat (2005). 
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enormous quantity of preserved material related to the Civil War and franquismo.17 It 
concluded that “neither the conflict, nor the transition to democracy, resulted in a massive 
destruction of documentation.” Generally-speaking, the location of funds was known, but 
they were often dispersed, badly-catalogued and not digitalized.18 If researchers had 
problems accessing them, then the difficulty resulted from problems related to cataloging, 
storage and staff shortages, rather than a concerted effort to limit access. Nonetheless, the 
report acknowledged that many had complained of the lack of standardized access 
procedures. This was exacerbated by the fact that the public agencies and private entities 
that guard the documents each have their own administrative cultures. Consequently, 
eligibility requirements, schedules and rules for consultation made research in civilian, 
military, ministerial, and state archives difficult. Yet, it is unfair to portray the disarray of 
the thousands of funds in a decentralized framework as a premeditated obstruction 
against the ‘right to knowledge.’ What is more, as a result of the public debate on 
historical memory and the HML stipulations on archives, there have been great advances 
in localization, conservation and catalogization at the Spanish Civil War Archive in 
Salamanca and throughout the country.19 
 On the other hand, demands for unrestricted access to archives run counter to 
concerns about privacy and security, which jurisprudence prioritizes. The Spanish 
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 Comisión Interministerial (2004, p. 46-47). 
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 The report identified further challenges. The documentation is in a precarious state because the files are 
incomplete, contain erroneous information or do not exist. Certain funds are poorly conserved. Yet, it is 
difficult to generalize about the state of the archives because of the great variety of situations, in terms of 
conservation, identification and guardianship of the funds. Translated from Spanish, ("Informe sobre 
archivos," Comisión Interministerial (2004, p. 46). 
19
 Comisión Interministerial (2004, p. 49). Also, refer to the HML: Art. 20 creates a documentation center 
of historical memory an archive of the civil war in Salamanca; Art. 22 established the legal right of access 
to funds from public and private entities; and the first additional provision authorizes the government to 
carry out the necessary actions to organize and restructure the General Archive of the Spanish Civil War.  
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Historical Heritage Act prohibits consulting documents that may affect the security of 
persons, their honor, the intimacy of their private and family life or their public image.20 
This stipulation was likely adopted to protect former functionaries who suppressed civil 
rights, as well as those who suffered repression and chose to forget it. Indeed, of 884 
registered funds, 412 identified victims.21 Nonetheless, the law grants relatively easy 
access to involved parties and, twenty-five years after their death, the public at large can 
access the documents.22 Spain has not adopted a freedom of information act, yet such 
legislation may strike a compromise between greater access and data protection by 
eliminating personal details prior to the release of documents. Until then, the state errs on 
the side of caution. 
 The adoption of the HML during the eighth legislature (2004-2008) was the most 
comprehensive and ambitious effort of historical reconciliation. It institutionalized 
measures that expanded the economic rights of victims, returned confiscated goods, 
regulated and preserved archives, removed fascist symbols and condemned the 
legitimacy of the execution sentences. Since it was adopted, the legislation has had far-
reaching and increasingly expansive implementation. The consular offices had to extend 
the period to petition for Spanish citizenship by an additional year after they received 
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 Article 57.1.c of  Ley 16/1985, de 25 de junio, del Patrimonio Histórico Español de 1985 prohibits 
consultation unless express permission by all parties has been given. Otherwise, the documents enter the 
public domain 25 years after the death of all parties involved or 50 years after the event, if the dates of 
death are unknown. 
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 Comisión Interministerial (2004, p. 32). 
22
 According to the law, access is not very restricted. Article 235 of the Ley Orgánica 6/1985, de 1 de Julio 
del Poder Judicial, permits consultation of the judicial administrative archives (Archivos Judiciales de 
Gestión) to those who have been party to legal proceedings or hold legitimate interest. Art. 1º of the 
“Instrucción de 4 de noviembre, de la Dirección General de los Registros y del Notariado, sobre acceso a la 
consulta de los libros de defunciones de los registros civiles” stipulates that academic researchers on the 
Civil War, franquismo, exile and the transition, as well as anyone who has received institutional aid, have 
legitimate interest. See, B.O.E., núm. 285, de 26 de noviembre de 2008. 
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over 520,000 requests, despite only originally estimating 310,000.23 Responding to public 
pressure, the state eased access to civil registries24 and modernized and opened the 
Military Judicial Archives, ensuring that the sentences of the military tribunals became 
publicly available.25 It introduced special pensions for the families of those deceased 
because of the Civil War, established minimum remunerations26 and advanced 
reconciliation by offering  €135,000 to the heirs of those who fell in the fight for 
democracy.27 It secured the right of International Brigadiers to Spanish citizenship by 
abolishing the need to renounce their former nationality28 and allowed children of exiles 
to obtain citizenship as well.29 Amendments to the HML provided homosexuals, who had 
been imprisoned for their orientation, with moral and economic reparation.30 New 
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 BOE, núm. 72, de 24 de marzo de 2010. 95.5% of the 161,463 petitions received during the first year 
were from Latin America and Miami. 56% of the 520,000 applications were from Cuba and Argentina. 
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 BOE, núm. 285, de 26 de noviembre de 2008. 
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 BOE, núm. 13, de 15 de enero de 2010. 
26
 BOE, núm. 309, de 24 de diciembre de 2009. 
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 BOE, núm. 276, de 15 de noviembre de 2008. 
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 By December 2010, 21 Brigadiers were awarded citizenship. For the legislation, see BOE, núm. 277, de 
17 de noviembre de 2008. 
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 BOE, núm. 285, de 26 de noviembre de 2008. The citizenship right is given via parents or grandparents. 
One must petition within two years of the publication of the law. Children of applicants can receive 
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de Vagos y Maleantes de 4 de agosto de 1933, and Ley 16/1970, de 4 de agosto, sobre Peligrosidad y 
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convivencia). See, Presupuestos Generales para 2009 (D.A. 18ª), Indemnización a expresos sociales. BOE, 
núm 309, de 24 de diciembre 2008. By December 2010, the Commission examined 143 applications and 
resolved the status of 138: 82 were approved; 44 were rejected; 13 were not admitted; and 4 are pending. 
Ministerio de la Presidencia (2010). 
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institutions were also created to implement the measures. A technical commission of 
experts would judge the proper removal of Franquist symbols31 and an Office for Victims 
would coordinate and popularize the expanding historical reconciliation efforts.32 
Collectively, these measures establish a significant increase in the scope and depth of 
efforts that the state has taken to advance the symbolic and economic reparation of 
victims. Additionally, they demonstrate how implementation of the HML has required 
the increased involvement of the state on matters, which had previously been delegated to 
the autonomies. Even where initially modest, the trend toward greater state participation 
in historical reconciliation is clear. 
 Yet, victims’ associations dispute this conclusion. They have criticized the state 
for insufficient funding, lacking a coordinated state policy, and ‘privatizing’ exhumations 
by delegating responsibility for them onto the families and associations.33 To a certain 
extent, such an evaluation is accurate. The exhumation debate became more pronounced 
only in 2002 after a UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances 
included Spain on its list of countries that had not addressed forcible detention.34 Even 
then, it was an NGO (the Association for Recovery of Historical Memory) that 
spearheaded the effort in October 2004 without any assistance from the center-right 
government of José María Aznar. Under PSOE, such initiatives have been state-
supported, but not state-led. 
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 BOE, núm. 51, de 28 de febrero de 2009. 
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 BOE, núm. 309, de 24 de diciembre de 2008. 
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 See, Díaz (2008). Some major organizations are Foro por la Memoria, Equipo Nizkor, Juristas por la 
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  24
 However, the situation is complicated by the fact that gravesites are located all 
over Spain; no one knows the exact number of victims (though 40,000 is commonly 
cited); and there are no standardized guidelines on exhumations. Nor do associations 
demand the same thing: some press for localization, exhumation and return of bodies, 
whereas others only require that the sites be recognized and commemorative monuments 
be built.35 There are also those, like the family of Federico García Lorca, who prefer that 
their relatives not be exhumed. Thus a common solution is not possible because of the 
multiplicity of judicial, historical, administrative and ethical factors. Exhumations must 
currently be undertaken and directed at the local level to ensure that the efforts are 
appropriate and sensitive to the needs of the parties affected. 
 This, however, does not mean that the state has rejected responsibility for the 
recuperation of historical memory. In fact, PSOE has undertaken a complete reversal of 
the policy of non-involvement of José María Aznar by subsidizing and providing 
logistical support for activities related to victims of the Civil War and the Dictatorship. 
Between 2006 and 2010, 642 projects valued at €19,475,985 were sponsored, the most 
important of which were exhumations, followed by reburial and improvement of 
gravesites, the production of registers of the disappeared, and partnerships with 
universities in the investigations (see Table 1).36 The average annual subsidies have 
ranged around €4 million and are expected to increase to around €6.5 million in 2011.37 
This confirms the trend of higher annual allotments begun in 2006.  Since 2010, half of 
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 Comision Interministerial (2006, pp. 81-83). 
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 For a record of the subsidized projects since adoption of the HML: BOE, núm. 76, de 29 de marzo de 
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these subsidies are legally designated for exhumations, where many projects have 
received close to the maximum amount of €60,000.38 The rest has been divided among 
projects that build memorial monuments, produce indices of the disappeared, compile 
and conserve oral history and testimonies, and protect and diffuse the cultural heritage 
associated with the Civil War and the subsequent political repression (see Figure 1, Table 
1). In sum, these subsidies represent a radical reversal of the state’s refusal to engage in 
historical memory recuperation and demonstrate that PSOE has recognized the salience 
of such efforts in partnership with victims’ associations and autonomous and regional 
administration. 
B) Analyzing the shortcomings: a compromise or an unreached stage? 
 Nonetheless, the socialist government has failed to use the HML to advance 
historical reconciliation in three areas: annulment of sentences, public exhumation 
efforts, and the thorough removal of Francoist symbols. As a response, some have 
commented that the specter of Francoism is still strong and directs the affairs of the 
state.39 While such a conclusion is too extreme, these shortcomings are the result of 
Spain’s unique path to democracy. I argue that (1) the division of power between the 
central state and the autonomies and (2) extolling the pacted transition have imposed 
certain limits on the state in terms of recuperating historical memory. These will be 
overcome only when there is a broader consensus among the regions and greater 
willingness to condemn Francoism unequivocally on the part of the people. 
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Alday, “La sombra del franquismo es alargada,” (2008, pp. 33-60). 
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 As of now, the socialist government has failed to use Law 52/2007 to annul all the 
execution sentences of Franco’s military tribunals.40 These are widely regarded as 
illegitimate because they were politically motivated show trials and the Consejos de 
Guerra and Tribunales Populares did not respect the concepts of due process or 
impartiality.41 Most organizations involved in the recuperation of historical memory have 
demanded the annulment of the sentences, which they interpret as incompatible with the 
principles of the rule of law. They have pointed to the elimination of the Nuremberg 
judgments as an exemplary effort to dismantle the Nazi state. The Republican Left of 
Catalonia (ERC) voted against the HML, stating that the socialists had buckled before the 
“most reactionary military forces” and accepted Francoist jurisprudence that parodied 
justice.42 
 PSOE was undeterred by these criticisms. It responded by stressing that Article 3 
of the HML strips the tribunal decisions of their legitimacy. The vice-president of the 
government argued that denouncement was superior to invalidation because it applied to 
cases where no sentence was passed.43 She criticized the opposition for overemphasizing 
the legal nature of the tribunal judgments and, therefore, implicitly legitimizing them. 
The legislation, she stressed, was an unprecedented act that went further than annulment 
because it allowed individuals to reconstruct their personal memory and public image for 
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 For a thorough analysis, Alday, “La declaración de ilegitimidad,” (2008, pp. 209-235). 
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 Errandonea (2008). Alday, “La declaración de ilegitimidad,” (2008, p. 210). 
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 Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados. Pleno y diputación permanente: VIII Legislatura, 
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the first time since the transition.44 Thus, PSOE presented the Historical Memory Law as 
an affirmation of solidarity with the victims,45 while downplaying its potential judicial 
relevance.46 
 In fact, this conflict is motivated by three concerns: legal certainty (seguridad 
juridica), reparations and transitional legitimacy. Although the first two have been used 
as arguments against annulment of sentences, neither is valid per se. The Popular Party 
cites seguridad juridica as the cornerstone of the legal system. It charges that any 
retroactive revision would endanger the constitutional arrangement of the state.47 The 
concept itself can be found in article 9.3 of the Constitution, but it is rarely portrayed 
correctly.48 Rather than safeguard the inviolable nature of Spanish jurisprudence, 
seguridad juridica aims to protect individual rights from political aggression, as 
perpetrated under Franco. What is more, the sentences do not form a legal precedent in 
jurisprudence, so that they can easily be removed from the codex without affecting any 
other acts. The second concern, which is hardly cited, deals with possible reparation 
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la irretroactividad de las disposiciones sancionadoras no favorables o restrictivas de derechos individuales, 
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claims.49 Yet, the Amnesty Law pardoned crimes of political nature for both prisoners 
and state functionaries. Consequently, the annulment of sentences would not give the 
families of victims the legal ground to bring lawsuits against the state.50 
 Therefore, sentences annulment is not impacted by judicial or economic 
considerations, but by social ones. They have not been declared invalid because to do so 
could imperil the legitimacy of the pacted transition. Such concerns are most clearly 
articulated by PP, which regards the Constitution as the only legitimate grail that binds 
Spaniards and the pacted transition between the old regime and democratic opposition as 
the only viable source of coexistence. Thus any action that questions the terms of the 
transition or emphasizes the legitimacy of the Second Republic over that of the 
Constitution of 1978 is regarded as a threat.  To a certain extent, Spaniards have 
internalized this viewpoint. In a 2002 survey, 37% of youth thought a dictatorship might 
sometimes be necessary, whereas in 2000 more than 80% of surveyed thought the 
transition was done in the best manner possible and 81.3% supported the monarchy 
without reservations.51 Such results demonstrate high popular regard for institutions born 
out of a deal between fascists and democrats. More importantly, these viewpoints have 
made the need to reexamine the compromises of the transition less salient.  
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 Errandonea (2008, p. 6). 
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 The Ministry of Justice has emphasized this point in relation to Article 4 of the HML, which allows 
victims to petition a declaration of moral reparation and personal recognition. By 2011, there were 1203 
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51
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 In any case, it is possible to wholeheartedly support the pacted transition and 
coexistence between Spaniards, while calling for the repeal of the sentences. Other than 
PP, most political players did so. The source of contention is implicit. Pressing to annul 
the sentences supposes that their condemnation was not just and that the accused 
republicans and democrats were acting lawfully in the face of an illegitimate force. It 
affirms the legitimacy of the Second Republic in opposition to the military regime that 
toppled it. This risks a historical debate that a majority of the public seemingly does not 
want. Moreover, such a discussion would impel society to reevaluate the legitimacy of 
the institutions born of the pacted transition: the monarchy, the charters of autonomy, and 
the non-federal political structure of the state, all of which are contentious compromises. 
 A similar pattern emerges in terms of exhumations, which are currently conducted 
by private associations, but with state assistance. When the vice-president introduced the 
HML, she was careful to present it only as an act of solidarity with the victims. She stated 
that “the government has never aimed to reconstruct or to institute a memory” unlike the 
dictatorship which “prevented many millions of Spaniards of surviving even in the 
memories of their loved ones.” The Historical Memory Law helped citizens to 
“rehabilitate the name of their relatives so that they may recuperate their honor and the 
dignity of their public identity.”52 Therefore, it was also the duty of the state to aid 
families in recovering the remains of relatives as part of a process of moral recognition of 
the victims. Yet the socialists refused to have the state act as the main regulator of 
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memory. They placed the accent on self-empowerment of victims with the aid of the 
government, which facilitated the exercise of their rights. 
 Nonetheless, the state has been unwilling to take full responsibility for righting 
the extrajudicial executions. Although such acts were perpetrated by Franco’s forces, his 
supporters would form the backbone of the state during the dictatorship. It was 
government functionaries who perpetrated the suppression of memory during almost four 
decades of Francoism. By privatizing the exhumations the socialists did aid the efforts of 
families, but they also gave them no choice in the matter. Whereas the government hailed 
privatized exhumations as empowerment, many see them as yet another unfair burden 
placed on victims.  
 I would argue that by rejecting to take greater initiative on exhumations, the state 
reaffirms the narrative of the two warring factions of the Civil War and the ‘two Spains’. 
This interpretation bolsters a skewed version of history because it equates the two sides 
under a common denominator of shared guilt. It ignores the significant asymmetry of 
repression and violence between Franco’ forces and the Republic. It turns a blind eye to 
unfairness: if the state apparatus perpetrated repression, it is the duty of the state to repair 
the caused damage. By delegating responsibility onto the families, the government 
blames one faction for the executions in order to safeguard its own neutral position and 
the legitimacy of the institutions that underpin it. Without the societal and political 
willpower to acknowledge the effects and vestiges of Francoism in contemporary Spain, 
it is unlikely that the state will truly fulfill its role in memory recuperation. Likewise, it 
will fail to restore the trust of those who were repressed and see the modern Spanish state 
as an extension of Franco’s work. 
  31
 The last shortcoming deals with the limited removal of Francoist symbols from 
public and private spaces. The implementation of this initiative should be the least 
contentious. For one, there is a sharp incompatibility between the state’s commitment to 
democracy and the preservation of monuments that glorify a military coup. Secondarily, 
the persistence of symbols can be understood as the survival of the regime’s ideals, 
memory and values; their existence affirms one of the fundamental goals of the 
dictatorship: to last.53 Finally, it is a visual reminder for victims of the abuse they 
suffered on the part of the regime, which is thus legitimized in the public space.54 And 
yet, fascist markers still exist. They are inscribed on the walls of churches. Equestrian 
statues of Franquist leaders grace the plazas of Santander, Toledo, Valencia and Ferrol. 
Franco’s bust is engraved in Salamanca’s 256-year old city square and streets and public 
sites abound with regime references in many parts of Spain.55 
 To a large degree, the failure is rooted in the vagueness of the law, which does not 
specify who is entrusted for implementation and what they must do. Article 15.1 of the 
HML mandates the removal of “shields, insignia, plaques, objects and commemorative 
mentions, whether individual or collective, that exalt the military uprising, the Civil War 
or the repression of the Dictatorship.”56 However, the law establishes regulations without 
specifying the responsible party for carrying them out. There are no benchmarks and no 
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 Art. 15.1: “Las Administraciones públicas, en el ejercicio de sus competencias, tomarán las medidas 
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central institution that ensures compliance. There is no explicit punitive mechanism to 
guarantee the removal of symbols. Until 2009, there was no commission to judge whether 
monuments could be preserved on artistic, architectural or artistic-religious grounds. The 
ambiguity of this legislation, which was envisioned as an act of solidarity with the 
victims, ensures that implementation of the law is voluntary, rather than mandatory. 
 More importantly, the division of power between the central state and the 
autonomies prevents the application of the law even further. Rather than serve as a 
binding legal instrument, the vagueness of the HML may convert it into principle-based 
soft law. As Rafael Escudero Alday notes, “these norms do not impose a particular 
solution per se, but rather seek and require agreement between different parties, often 
with opposing political interests, for their goals to take effect.”57 To be sure, legal 
instruments do exist. Articles 15.1 and 15.4 permit the withdrawal of public aid and 
grants for those public administrations and private owners who preserve outlawed 
symbols. Additionally, the central government could bring city halls to court for non-
compliance.58 Yet, in practice, implementation has been left in the hands of the 
autonomous communities and city administrations. Some, mainly in the Basque Country 
and Catalonia, were very effective at cleansing their public spaces much earlier than the 
adoption of the HML, whereas in other regions and smaller cities application has not 
been a priority. The wide degree of latitude in self-administration coupled with lack of 
political will has led to the uneven application of state law. 
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 In a way, this reflects the logic that guides the Historical Memory Law: in terms 
of memory recuperation, it is often reactive, rather than proactive. The legislation 
provides assistance to right injustice, but does not penalize; it removes symbols, but does 
not institute new ones; it preserves archives, but does not eagerly disseminate their 
contents. The monument at the Valle de los Caídos (Valley of the Fallen) is a good 
example. Envisioned as a “national act of atonement” by Franco, it is supposedly 
dedicated to all the victims of Civil War, whether civilian and military Republican or 
Nationalist. In reality, this pharaohnic monument had become a pilgrimage site for right-
wing groups as it houses the remains of the Caudillo and Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, 
founder of the fascist Falange. Article 16 of the HML forbids political manifestation at 
the site and orders that acts of remembrance and education take place. Yet, there are no 
plaques or expositions that show that the basilica was built by up to 27,000 Republican 
prisoners, many of whom lost their lives.59 The state has had difficulty to re-
conceptualize this monument. Instead of converting it into a museum, the administration 
has limited the venue of events and even closed it.60 This amounts to a missed 
opportunity to recuperate memory and to project a fairer account of national history. 
 In sum, shortcomings in annulment of sentences, public exhumation efforts, and 
the removal of Francoist symbols are the result of political factors. To a certain degree, 
the autonomy given to the regions has empowered them to advance pensions, memory 
recuperation, and eliminate the vestiges of Francosim. Simultaneously, it has removed the 
pressure from those municipalities that do not wish to adopt such measures. More 
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after public criticism mounted. 
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importantly, reconciliation efforts are limited by politicians who eschew a comprehensive 
reexamination of the transition. The pacto de olvido was a political process that 
deliberately avoided dealing with the legacy of fascism. Yet, Spanish institutions are still 
marred by their association with the old regime. Politicians hail the 1978 Constitution and 
the pacted transition as holy grails that legitimate the state and bind Spaniards. In seeking 
to protect their undisputed legitimacy (sacredness), the political class has made 
compromises that can be righted only when the vestiges of Francoism are confronted and 
judged honestly and openly. 
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Figure 1: Government grants made in the period 2006-2010, categorized by amount of total funding. 
 
 
Source: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia (2011), “Datos por presupuesto.” 
 
Table 1: Grants made in the period 2006-2010, categorized by domain. 
 
Domain 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
Archives and 
Censuses 
394,882.58 435,132.72 376,423.70 263,206.93 684,371.35 2,154,017.28 
Documentaries 138,440.00 275,278.00 478,985.00 450,484.20 388,810.46 1,731,997.66 
Commemoration 507,524.93 259,502.00 118,000.00 71,456.57 128,058.58 1,084,542.08 
Studies 50,000.00 139,000.00 82,881.05 153,588.96 366,096.19 791,566.20 
Exhibitions 158,013.34 270,012.00 323,170.00 229,000.00 287,589.30 1,267,784.64 
Graves 725,175.01 549,673.10 1,070,595.31 1,397,405.28 2,175,457.34 5,918,306.04 
Tributes 190,000.00 64,180.00 223,570.00 44,136.80 186,199.00 708,085.80 
Journals 207,455.00 312,135.13 295,552.60 273,815.74 198,709.25 1,287,667.72 
Others 154,500.00 88,759.00 120,450.00 140,500.00 245,700.08 749,909.08 
Publications 88,600.00 146,250.00 273,260.00 311,405.50 307,952.00 1,127,467.50 
Testimonies 385,409.14 477,063.00 545,112.08 535,000.00 712,056.45 2,654,640.67 
TOTAL 3,000,000.00 
 
3,016,984.95 
 
3,907,999.74 
 
3,869,999.98 
 
5,681,000.00 
 
19,475,984.67 
 
Source: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia (2011), “Datos por presupuesto.” 
 
Note: In the original document, the calculation of the totals is erroneous. It is corrected in my table. 
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Chapter IV: 
A Historical Reconciliation Model: political actors, forces, stages 
 
 Popular discourse credits collective amnesia and inaction in terms of transitional 
justice for Spain’s functioning democracy. By contrast, I believe that the success of the 
conflict-free transition lies in the specialization of societal forces that sought to right the 
injustices of the former regime. Firstly, I show that the political class, impelled by 
regional left-leaning parties, adopted reparation measures that rewarded victims with 
pensions and later with moral recognition. The contentious task of exposing the abuses of 
the regime and recuperating historical memory was the responsibility of academia, 
victims associations and international actors. This division of labor strengthened 
coexistence as well as contemplation efforts. Secondarily, I analyze the four stages of the 
historical reconciliation process (negation, amnesia, accommodation, reconciliation), 
arguing that each successive one represents a stronger rejection of Francoism. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
A) Political steps: the forces behind the sequential reparation efforts 
 During the First Legislature (1979-1982), the vast majority of initiatives 
benefitted widows, invalids, former soldiers as well as relatives of civilians who had died 
during the Civil War. The goal of the government was to end the existing situation of 
inequality between the two factions by extending financial compensation to all victims, 
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regardless of political affiliation. In practice, this took on the least controversial form of 
reparations - pensions - and favored republicans, who had been excluded from Franquist 
welfare arrangements. Furthermore, two aspects of the legislation were noteworthy. 
Firstly, most of the adopted initiatives were legally binding bills (proposiciones de ley), 
which demonstrated the government resolve to end the overt discrimination against the 
losing faction. Secondly, the initiatives dealt with economic benefits because pre-
constitutional legislative acts already regulated amnesty law and reparation legislation on 
the Civil War. Thus, the goal of the initiatives was to modify these legislative acts by 
expanding their coverage, rather than to supplant them. 
 An analysis of the six adopted bills reveals that they had strong parliamentary 
support, as they were approved unanimously or with the backing of more than 95% of the 
members of Parliament. This is equally valid for the two non-legally binding motions, 
which amended pensions for soldiers and recognized prison time for political reasons as 
working time in estimating Social Security payments. In light of such support, it is 
striking that most of the initiatives were introduced by left-leaning minority parties, 
rather than a majority group. Of the 13 presented, the Catalonian socialists were the most 
active with six proposals; the communists presented four and the Socialist Group 
presented three. Respectively, half of these were approved, while the rest were not 
debated, and none was rejected (see Appendix B, Tables 1, 2). 
 During the Second Legislature (1982-1986), fewer initiatives were presented and 
these were almost exclusively pension-related. Law 37/1984 targeted those who 
participated in the republican army, but were not members of the armed forces or police 
during the Civil War. Law 18/1984 recognized prison time for political reasons as 
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working years in terms of Social Security. These pieces of legislation resulted in a 
significant increase of applications, which promoted further initiatives to speed up 
processing time and accelerate the payment of pensions. Once again, the most active 
parliamentary group was left-leaning and had minority status. A Mixed Group, 
dominated by the communists, presented 50% of the initiatives; the Congress accepted 
one of them and rejected the other. On the other hand, the Socialist Group presented 20% 
of the initiatives, all of which were approved. 
 The Third Legislature (1986-1989) was unusual in that no initiatives were either 
debated or approved. Nonetheless, a Mixed Group (United Left and the Initiative for 
Catalonia) presented various initiatives to compensate those who had suffered prison 
terms, as regulated by the Amnesty Law. This marked the first (unsuccessful) non-
pension attempt to recognize the right to economic and moral reparation for victims of 
the dictatorship. Moreover, the return of confiscated assets to parties, political 
associations, and trade unions dominated 70% of the agenda and resulted in two laws on 
the issue.1 In May 1989, the Congressional Commission on Culture and Education 
rejected a non-binding motion by the Catalan Minority Group for the return of archives to 
Catalonia, which had been seized during the Civil War. The trend of politically-active 
minority parties was strengthened under this legislature as well. A Mixed Group of the 
Christian Democrats and the United Left Group represented 65% of presented initiatives, 
whereas the remaining 35% was the product of the Basque and Catalan Minorities. 
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 Two laws for the return of property and compensation of unions and parties were adopted during this 
time. These are La Ley 4/1986, de 8 de enero, de Cesión de bienes del patrimonio sindical acumulado 
(developed by Real Decreto 1671/1986, de 1 de agosto) and La Ley 43/1998 de 15 de diciembre, de 
Restitución o compensación a los partidos políticos de bienes y derechos incautados en aplicación de la 
normativa sobre responsabilidades políticas del período 1936-1939 (developed by Real Decreto 610/1999, 
de 16 de abril). 
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 During the Fourth Legislature (1989-1993), there were important debates related 
to the 18th additional provision of the national budget, which established compensations 
for those who had suffered three years of prison time on political grounds (see Appx. D, 
Table 1). Simultaneously, it approved a motion by the Catalan “Convergence and Union” 
to return the “Commissariat de Propaganda” archives, which had been confiscated during 
the Civil War. Lastly, the government adopted its first symbolic act of historical memory 
recuperation by commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Manuel Azaña 
who was the first prime minister of the Second Republic. A minority Basque Group was 
the most active force with 42% of the proposed initiatives, although all were rejected. For 
the first time, there was increased attention paid to historical reconciliation by 
commemorating Azaña and recognizing the “children exiles” (los niños de guerra). Yet, 
pensions and economic compensations accounted for 50% of the presented initiatives, 
demonstrating the continuous importance of economic reparation.  
 During the Fifth Legislature (1993-1996) the question of archives became more 
prominent, as Mixed Groups (ERC and the United Left/Initiative for Catalonia-IU/IC) 
brought several motions and written questions before the Congress. The Senate approved 
a motion that urged the government to solve the question of the niños de guerra, 
especially in regards to their pensions. Finally, a joint effort by the Socialist Group, the 
United Left/Initiative for Catalonia, and the Basque PNV introduced the right of Spanish 
citizenship for the volunteers of the International Brigades. It is noteworthy that all three 
aforementioned initiatives were adopted with the full backing of all parliamentary groups. 
In terms of proposed initiatives, regional parties were once again the most active. The 
United Left, Basques, and Mixed Group (ERC) proposed 90% of the initiatives, of which 
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30% dealt with returning confiscated property during the Civil War, 40% with returning 
of archives to Catalonia from Salamanca, and the remaining 30% with economic 
compensations for victims. 
 During the Sixth Legislature (1996-2000), a Mixed Group (ERC) once again 
raised the question of archives recuperation, whereas the Socialist Group, the United 
Left, Convergence and Union, the Basque PNV, the Canarian Coalition and a Mixed 
Group commemorated the 60th anniversary of the end of the Civil War by condemning 
Franco’s regime. At the request of the ERC, attention was brought to the court martial of 
Lluis Companys, the 123rd president of Catalonia who was executed after the Civil War. 
This symbolic act was accompanied by an initiative by the United Left for the 
rehabilitation and recognition of Spanish guerrilla fighters, which expired without being 
debated. On the other hand, efforts to expand the benefits of republican nurses and to 
return confiscated property at Cervas-Ares were both successful. The socialists, Catalans, 
United Left, and Mixed Group accounted for 18 of the proposed initiatives, the other one 
being the product of the People’s Party (see Appx. A, Table 5; Appx. B, Table 8). 
 At last, under the Seventh Legislature (2000-2004), the emphasis changed from 
economic reparation for victims of the Civil War and Dictatorship to recognition of their 
dignity, moral reparation and recuperation of historical memory. Five unsuccessful 
initiatives signaled this reorientation. In 2001, all groups except for the PP voted to 
condemn the 1936 military uprising. Two initiatives proposed to convert the Valley of the 
Fallen into a memorial for the victims, whereas two others proposed to annul the 
execution sentences of Franco’s tribunals. By 2002, a successful joint motion expressed 
moral recognition of the victims of the Civil War and those who were repressed during 
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the Dictatorship. Similar initiatives demonstrated unanimous support for the 
rehabilitation of Spanish guerilla fighters; prisoners turned forced laborers; exiled 
Spaniards; and repressed democrats. A motion by the socialists urged exhumations as 
vehicles to restore the dignity of the disappeared, whereas the Basques supported a 
similar imitative for executed persons during the regime. In June 2004, the Congress 
approved a motion, which urged the government to complete a thorough study about the 
damages of the Civil War and the Dictatorship. This resulted in an interministerial 
commission that studied historical reconciliation efforts in detail and recommended many 
of the initiatives that would form the Historical Memory Law. 
 This unprecedented number of initiatives was brought to the front of the 
legislative agenda by minority and left-leaning parties (see Appx. B, Table 10). The 
United Left and the Mixed Group advanced 70% of the proposed acts. In the Mixed 
Group, 40% of them were the work of Basque EA; 20% were advanced by the ERC, and 
25% by the Initiative for Catalonia Greens-ICV. The different political formations 
focused on distinct topics. The United Left was preoccupied with moral reparation and 
public recognition of victims in 55% of its initiatives and examined economic reparation 
through the other 40%. The Catalan Group was mostly interested in the return of archives 
and confiscated property to Catalonia, a concern shared by other Catalan parties like the 
ICV and the ERC.  
 Under the Eighth Legislature (2004-2008), there was a very significant growth in 
both the number and scope of initiatives relating to historical reconciliation. Law 3/2005 
provided a one-time reparation payment to those who were exiled from Spain as children 
and Law 13/2005 modified the cultural heritage Law 4/1986, which permitted the return 
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of archival units to Catalonia. In 2004, a military tribunal sentence was annulled for the 
first time when Lluis Companys’ name was cleared. Two years later, the Year of 
Historical Memory was declared. Finally, the adoption of Law 52/2007 resulted in a 
marked increase in initiatives and presidential acts. These served to translate the 
intentions of the HML into concrete actions, to establish regulatory and technical 
commission for its implementation, and to expand its application through successive 
royal decrees of the Ministry of Justice and the Presidency (see Appx. A, Table 8). 
 An analysis of 81 initiatives from the Eighth Legislature reaffirms the trend in 
historical reconciliation legislation: they were predominately not legally-binding and the 
product of minority and left-leaning parties (see Appx. B, Tables 12, 13). 66 were non-
binding motions (proposiciones no de ley), though only 15 were approved. Rather than 
rejection, most of the rest expired without being debated. Once again, the most active 
parliamentary groups were the ERC and the Group United Left/Initiative for Catalonia 
Greens, which respectively presented 25 and 24 of the studied initiatives. The rest were 
the efforts of Catalan, Basque and Mixed groups, whereas PSOE and PP presented only 4 
initiatives each by themselves. 
 In sum, it is clear that Spanish historical reconciliation has been a gradual process. 
Contrary to general criticisms that a pact of forgetting has invalidated or slowed the 
effort, we can see that reparation measures have commanded the attention of 
policymakers since the first legislature. Furthermore three patterns define the process. 
Firstly, proposed initiatives (whether motions or legally binding acts) are usually the 
product of minority or regional parties. This is not surprising as many of the beneficiaries 
were victims from the regional autonomies, repressed by Franco. Secondly, the vast 
  43
majority of these are left-leaning parties, establishing political ideology as a relevant 
cleavage and a stable predictor of support for the advancement of historical 
reconciliation. Lastly, most initiatives have dealt with economic reparations (i.e. 
pensions) and there has been a gradual willingness to engage more contentious topics as 
Spaniards distance themselves from the Francoist regime.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
B) The four stages of historical reconciliation 
 The effort to face and account for the legacy of the Civil War and the repressive 
regime can roughly be divided into four stages. The absence of a radical break with 
Francoism ensures that there is certain continuity across these periods. This risks 
overshadowing the differences in policies adopted by the eight legislatures and the 
activity of civil society, which has most vocally challenged the legacy of the dictatorship. 
Nonetheless, gradualism and the aforementioned “ratchet effect” explain the speed and 
function of the legislation. Progress was initially slow and limited, but has consistently 
moved toward expansion of the scope and level of benefits. Whereas earlier efforts 
focused on economic reparation, essentially pension-related, after 1996 these initiatives 
became secondary due to numerous extensions of the legislation and a marked decrease 
in beneficiaries. In turn, time passage, a gradual replacement of societal values and 
pressures from international actors have impelled politicians to take stronger measures in 
tackling the vestiges of the regime. 
 The first stage of the process was the negation of memory (1936-1977), which 
developed under four decades of Francoism. Rather than reconcile the division between 
Spaniards, the government monopolized social institutions and public discourse in order 
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to self-legitimize. This took on several forms. The fascists eliminated the symbolic 
presence of the Second Republic by removing all monuments and references to the 
democratic period. This was accompanied by the institution of Nationalist symbolic 
discourse, which firmly implanted the regime in the public consciousness. New collective 
rituals such as fascist songs, public affirmations of loyalty, oaths, extended arm salutes, 
Catholic rites, and stenciled slogans on walls reminded citizens of the permanence of the 
dictatorship.2 Street and plaza names were replaced to celebrate noted members of the 
National Movement. There was widespread repression of any suspected republicans, 
regional cultural identities, and left-wing trade unions. The prison population in 1940 
swelled to 300,000 out of 25.9 million, almost a ten-fold increase in comparison to 
January 1936.3 Republicans and sympathizers were extremely limited in employment 
opportunities and their children were prevented from attending university. Welfare aid 
was reserved for supporters of the regime, which punished the losing faction and 
exacerbated the divisions among citizens. 
 A period of amnesia (1977-1981) defined the early transition after Franco’s death. 
Rather than abruptly break with fascism, politicians adopted a pacted transition and 
eschewed discussion on contentious topics of memory and repression. In exchange for 
this political silence, two measures served to advance the compromise: the 1977 Amnesty 
Law and pensions. The former allowed political prisoners to be released and reintegrate 
into society in return for legal safeguards that state functionaries and members of the 
public order would not be prosecuted for violating citizen rights. On the other hand, the 
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 Brincat (2005). 
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political class employed pensions for republicans as a form of monetary reparation and as 
a convenient vehicle for historical reconciliation. Regional autonomies saw them as the 
overdue benefit owed to their discriminated people. A politically-sensitive central 
government could frame them as an earned social entitlement for citizens. Either way, 
socially disadvantaged individuals received deserved state support whereas the meaning 
of the action was left to individual interpretation. The failed military coup in February 
1981 reminded the political class that the transition was far from over. It encouraged 
policymakers to concentrate on solving immediate social problems, such as a 20% 
unemployment rate, difficulties in advancing regional government and responding 
adequately to ETA violence. In short, this was not the moment to expose the violations of 
the old regime, especially as many citizens and the army were skeptical of the 
competence of the democratic government.  
 An accommodation period (1982-2002) defined the next two decades of the 
Spanish transition. Under the auspices of the socialist government, several pensions laws 
benefitting republicans were passed. These ended discriminatory practices in estimating 
state benefits for former military members and they ensured that time spent in prison for 
political reasons could be counted as working years in estimating Social Security 
payments. Although the five legislatures did not adopt any legally-binding bills to 
advance historical reconciliation, a number of actions demonstrated the increased 
willingness of the political class to tackle questions of memory and social justice. Among 
these, notable examples were the commemoration of Manuel Azaña, the revision of Blas 
Infante Perez’s tribunal sentence, the extension of citizenship to International Brigadiers, 
the return of confiscated property to trade unions, and denouncing the old regime on the 
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60th anniversary of the Civil War. In 2002, more sensitive topics emerged on the agenda. 
There was official recognition of forced laborers, war exiles, and democrats repressed 
under the dictatorship. Socialists and Basques equated exhumations of disappeared and 
executed persons with dignity recuperation (see Appx. A, Tables 2-6).  
 Indeed, legislative interest could be observed even when initiatives were not 
approved. A detailed analysis of the questions raised in parliament shows that the return 
of confiscated property of political parties and trade unions was raised as early as 1979. 
Yet, no legislation was adopted until 1986 (see Appx.  C, Table 1).4 Similarly, concerns 
about documents and archives, removal of fascist symbols, revising tribunal trials and 
sentences were expressed far earlier than the HML draft. These are markers of the 
interest of left politicians in historical reconciliation legislation (see Appendix B). 
Judging from this information, we can see that there were numerous attempts to 
recuperate historical memory and to recognize victims before the legislation of 2007. 
Thus, we should interpret these expired or non-debated initiatives, non-binding motions 
and raised questions as the precursors to the Historical Memory Law. 
 Nonetheless, this demonstrated attention and legislative acts should not 
overshadow the very significant role of civil society, academia and international 
institutions. During the 1980s there was a marked increase in disseminated academic 
works on the Civil War and the Dictatorship. Although their findings were not 
immediately recognized by the legislature, they served to change the societal outlook on 
                                                 
4
 The relevant legislation for the return of confiscated property is: Ley 4/1986, de 8 de enero, de Cesión de 
bienes del patrimonio sindical acumulado that was developed by Real Decreto 1671-1986, de 1 de agosto 
and Ley 43/1998, de 15 de diciembre, de Restitución o compensación a los partidos políticos de bienes y 
derechos incautados en aplicación de la normativa sobre responsabilidades políticas del período 1936-1939 
that was developed by Real Decreto 610/1999, de 16 de abril. 
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the old regime and bolster support for democratic institutions. The popularization of 
victim narratives has been an essential part of the healing process. It also legitimizes state 
funding for memory recuperation and exhumation initiatives. Accordingly, victims and 
civil associations have engaged the legislature, offered testimonies, and advanced 
proposals to ensure that reconciliation remain on the political agenda.5  
 International actors have bolstered the effort by popularizing the issue in the 
media and by putting pressure on domestic politicians. Amnesty International’s news 
headlines shone light on limited government efforts to respect rights to moral and 
economic reparations. The preamble of the HML cited the condemnation of the Council 
of Europe as an impetus to perform an act of solidarity with the victims. Reports by the 
UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances spurred Spain under 
PSOE to assist its citizens in exhumation efforts. Even though such acts are not legally-
binding, they have enabled or forced politicians to engage in politically contentious 
policymaking. 
 The last stage of the process has been the advancement of historical reconciliation 
since 2002. This year is significant because citizens organized to pressure the state to 
confront the legacy of Francoism, reflected in the mass graves.6 Also, it marked the first 
instance when taboo subjects such as the disappeared and executed dominated the focus 
of the historical reconciliation agenda. Despite the extreme reluctance of the People’s 
Party to advance memory recuperation efforts, previous legislation had paved the road for 
                                                 
5
 The inter-ministerial commission recognizes 36 associations that have maintained consistent contact with 
the government. See Comision Interministerial (2006, pp. 13-14).  
6
 Contrary to popular academic citations, the United Nations did not include Spain on a list of offenders, 
but rather responded to petitions from the Association for the Recuperation of Historical Memory. See, 
Tremlett (2002). Also, UNWGEID (2011). 
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a more thorough examination. Pensions could not appease the public as there were fewer 
beneficiaries and the legislation had been extended to its limits.7 However, the 
recuperation of regional archives and the removal of fascist symbols provided a different 
terrain to symbolically confront the old regime and reassert the autonomy of the regional 
communities. The exhumation efforts and the annulment of tribunal sentences were an 
especially important new frontier. In contrast to pensions, they were highly symbolic and 
emotionally-charged issues. The protagonists have been the families of the victims and 
they have mostly had no direct contact with the dictatorship. As such, a younger 
generation that grew up with the values of democratic Spain has had the ability to direct 
the reconciliation process. More interestingly, their involvement has served as a 
barometer of the willingness of Spaniards to prioritize democracy and dismantle the 
vestiges of Francoism. 
 As I argued in Chapter III, the adoption of the Historical Memory Law was the 
most significant pinnacle of historical reconciliation legislation. Unlike previous 
initiatives that regulate memory and moral reparation passed during the period of 
accommodation, it is a legally-binding bill.8 Because it is a national law and it can 
withdrawal public aid for entities that do not comply with it (Art. 15.1 and 15.4), the 
HML has provisions to pressure administrations to comply with it. Its area of competence 
is unprecedented. In the few years since its adoption, the central administration has 
struggled to fully implement it. In granting citizenship, this was due to the popularity of 
                                                 
7
 The number of beneficiaries has been decreasing both because of welfare consolidations and because of 
the drop in recipients. In 2005, there were 105,019 and in 2006 there were 95,943. The average pension for 
a recipient is €708, whereas relatives receive around €400. Comisión Interministerial (2006, p. 57).  
8
 Here, I reiterate the distinction between proposición de ley (a legally-biding bill proposed by Members of 
Parliament) and proposición no de ley (a motion not proponed by the government and without legal binding 
power). 
  49
its provisions;9 in regards to symbols removal, this resulted from limited political will to 
enforce the law. Nonetheless, the creation of technical commissions and regulatory 
institutions, and the expansion of annual subsidies have demonstrated the state’s 
commitment to democratic and balanced memory recuperation. Moreover, these 
initiatives are now institutionally and legally entrenched. They will likely benefit from 
the fading of memory of older generations that were reluctant to engage the legacy of the 
Civil War. A collective sense of guilt will no longer act as a roadblock. Societal values, 
grounded in democracy and European cosmopolitanism, will encourage younger 
generations to adopt a more critical stance towards the dictatorship. Gradualism, even 
under slow tempos, has allowed Spaniards to right the injustices of the old regime and to 
successively reject the compatibility of Francoist vestiges with modern society. 
                                                 
9
 By October 31, 2010 Spain had approved 151,400 applications for citizenship. 
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Table 2: Results of Congress of Deputies national elections (1977-2012): party, percentage won, seats. 
 
Suárez - UCD 
MINORITY GOVN. 
 
1
9
7
7
-
1
9
7
9 
PSOE 
PCE 
PSP-US 
Other  
PNV 
UCD 
AP 
PDPC 
29.32% 
9.33% 
4.46% 
2.43% 
1.62% 
34.44% 
8.21% 
2.81% 
118 
19 
6 
6 
8 
166 
16 
11 
 
González - PSOE 
MAJORITY GOVN. 
 
1
9
8
9
-
1
9
9
3 
PSOE 
IU 
HB 
PNV 
Other 
PP 
CiU 
CDS 
39.60% 
9.07% 
1.06% 
1.24% 
3.60% 
25.79% 
5.04% 
7.89% 
175 
17 
4 
5 
10 
107 
18 
14 
 
Zapatero - PSOE 
MINORITY GOVN. 
 
2
0
0
4
-
2
0
0
8 
PSOE 
ERC 
IU 
Other 
PNV 
CC 
PP 
CiU 
42.59% 
2.52% 
4.96% 
1.72% 
1.63% 
0.91% 
37.71% 
3.23% 
164 
8 
5 
5 
7 
3 
148 
10 
 
 
Suárez / Calvo-Sotelo - UCD 
MINORITY GOVN. 
 
1
9
7
9
-
1
9
8
2 
PSOE 
PCE 
PSA-PA 
HB 
Other 
PNV 
UCD 
CD 
CiU 
30.40% 
10.77% 
1.81% 
0.96% 
3.82% 
1.65% 
34.84% 
6.05% 
2.69% 
121 
23 
5 
3 
5 
7 
168 
10 
8 
 
 
González - PSOE 
MINORITY GOVN. 
 
1
9
9
3
-
1
9
9
6 
PSOE 
IU 
Other 
PNV 
CC 
PP 
CiU 
 
 
38.78% 
9.55% 
3.32% 
1.24% 
0.88% 
34.76% 
4.94% 
159 
18 
6 
5 
4 
141 
17 
 
 
Zapatero - PP 
MINORITY GOVN. 
 
2
0
0
8
-
2
0
1
2 
PSOE 
ERC 
Other 
PNV 
PP 
CiU 
 
 
 
43.87% 
1.16% 
6.72% 
1.19% 
39.94% 
3.03% 
169 
3 
8 
6 
154 
10 
 
 
González - PSOE 
MAJORITY GOVN. 
 
1
9
8
2
-
1
9
8
6 
PSOE 
PCE 
Other 
PNV 
CP 
CiU 
UCD 
48.11% 
4.02% 
5.01% 
1.88% 
26.36% 
3.67% 
6.77% 
202 
4 
6 
8 
107 
12 
11 
 
 
Aznar - PP 
MINORITY GOVN. 
 
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
0 
PSOE 
IU 
Other 
PNV 
CC 
PP 
CiU 
 
37.46% 
10.54% 
3.10% 
1.27% 
0.88% 
38.79% 
4.60% 
141 
21 
7 
5 
4 
156 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
González - PSOE 
MAJORITY GOVN. 
 
1
9
8
6
-
1
9
8
9 
PSOE 
IU 
HB 
PNV 
CP 
CDS 
CiU 
Other 
44.06% 
4.63% 
1.15% 
1.53% 
25.97% 
9.22% 
5.02% 
1.94% 
184 
7 
5 
6 
105 
19 
18 
6 
 
 
Aznar - PP 
MAJORITY GOVN. 
 
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
4 
PSOE 
IU 
BNG 
Other 
PNV 
CC 
PP 
CiU 
34.16% 
5.45% 
1.32% 
3.00% 
1.53% 
1.07% 
44.52% 
4.19% 
125 
8 
3 
5 
7 
4 
183 
15 
 
 
 
Source: On party positioning, Liesbet Hooghe (2010). On elections, Congreso de los Diputados (2004). 
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Figure 2: The four stages of Spanish historical reconciliation: key actors, legislation and major developments 
 
 
Negation of Memory 
(1936-1977) 
Politics of Amnesia 
(1977-1981) 
Accommodation Period 
(1982-2002) 
Historical Reconciliation 
(2002-) 
A
C
T
O
R
S
  
Falangists: fanatics and bureaucrats. 
Collaborators. Opportunists. 
Conformists. Catholic Church. 
 
 
UCD, PSOE for Amnesty Law. 
Catalonian socialists and Congress 
communists. 
 
Academia.  
Minority/regional left-leaning 
parties. 
 
Victims’ associations.  
PSOE for HML and implementation. 
Minority/regional left-leaning 
parties. 
L
E
G
I
S
L
A
T
I
O
N
 
 
- decretos benefitting Nationalists 
- anti-masonry/communism tribunals 
- organic Laws concentrate power 
- Pacts of Madrid: US aid to Spain 
- Amnesty Law of 1977 pardons 
political prisoners and state 
functionaries 
 
 
- pensions for republicans: widows, 
invalids, former soldiers (around €17 
billion disbursed by 2005) 
- prison time counted as working 
time for Social Security 
- extends pensions for republicans 
- patrimony law to protect archives 
- returns archives to Catalonia 
- returns union and party property 
- compensations for prison time 
- recognizes niños de guerra 
- all parties denounce the regime 
- Lluis Company sentence revisited 
- recognizes forced laborers 
 
- establishment of Interministerial 
Commission 
- 2002: Asturias and Catalonia 
support exhumation initiatives 
- payment to forced exiles 
- Historical Memory Law 
- Office of Victims established 
- technical commission on symbols 
P
O
L
I
T
I
C
A
L
 
A
C
T
S
 
 
- merging all right-wing parties 
under the Falange (FET) 
- 1947 Law of Succession: Franco 
rules the newly-made monarchy 
- elimination of autonomy statutes 
- Juan Carlos dismantles Franco’s 
institutions: revival of pol. parties 
 
- Constitution of 1978 adopted  
- 23-F 1981: military coup attempt 
- Juan Carlos defends the transition 
 
- 1982: Spain joins NATO 
- 1982: PSOE wins sizeable majority 
- United Left formed by communists 
- 1986: PSOE returns properties and 
pays restitutions to unions 
- 1986: Spain joins EEC 
- 1996: Aznar enters power 
- 2000: People’s Party wins majority  
 
- UN Working Group criticizes 
Spain for ignoring mass graves 
- 2004: PSOE wins elections 
- Council of Europe condemns the 
Franco regime 
- parties receive €21 million in 
economic compensations 
S
O
C
I
A
L
 
A
C
T
S
 
- executions of Republicans 
- suppression of regionalism, left-
wing unions, liberal politics 
- trade union consolidation 
- civil rights curtailed; censorship 
- trade unions property confiscated 
- opposition groups form 
 
 
- pacto de olvido adopted 
- Spain reaffirms democracy path 
 
- significant increase in publications 
on repression 
- public debate on the legacy of the 
dictatorship emerges 
- victims testimonies emerge 
- 1980: ETA kills 118 people  
 
 
- emergence of memory recuperation 
groups (ARMH) 
- clean records of gays, reparations 
- exhumation of mass graves 
- removal of symbols and statues 
- Baltasar Garzón indicted 
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Conclusion: 
 The Spanish historical reconciliation process has served a dual role: to 
compensate the victims of the Civil War and Dictatorship and to reject Francoism. This 
effort, which is the basis of the Historical Memory Law, is contentious not because of its 
moral and economic reparation initiatives, but because of its symbolic significance. 
Conservatives in the PP reject it as a threat to the pacted transition, the constitutional 
arrangement of the state and for fear of examining old wounds (many caused by their 
own fathers). Researchers, victims’ associations and regional left parties have been the 
backbone of the effort for reparations and memory recuperation. Yet, they have often 
criticized the government, whether PP or PSOE, for insufficient action and making 
concessions in terms of the fascist legacy. Because of its politically sensitive nature, the 
reconciliation effort is often portrayed incorrectly. Critics seek to vilify its intent or 
emphasize its uselessness, whereas supporters frame it as a mere act of solidarity with 
victims.  
 In fact, the HML and the economic reparations that preceded it are political 
statements. Despite claims that the state did not respect the right to compensation, over 
16.361 billion euro have been paid to republican victims; and this has been 
complemented by 391 million euro for imprisonment on political grounds. Since the 
adoption of the HML, the state has expanded the initiatives to cover homosexuals who 
suffered repression because of their orientation, exiled Spaniards and their descendants, 
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forced laborers, and the ‘children of war’. It has restituted the property of unions and 
parties and returned confiscated Catalonian archives. PSOE has spent over 5 million euro 
annually on hundreds of initiatives that recuperate historical memory through 
exhumations, exhibits and publications. The budget has grown steadily since 2006. These 
acts, some of which were adopted at the onset of the transition, show the financial 
commitment of the state to aiding the victims of fascism. Even when not framed as 
reparation, their intent is clear: to make amends for the injustice of the old regime. 
 Secondarily, the effort has been gradual because of political considerations. At the 
onset of the transition, the frailty of democracy and the threat of a military coup silenced 
the political class. There was need to sanctify the transition and the Constitution, as the 
unifying forces that bind Spaniards in the different autonomies. Consequently, it imposed 
restrictions on facing the past. Until the state’s unity and democratic identity had been 
established, memory recuperation on the political level risked destabilizing debates on the 
monarchy, the autonomy statues, preferential taxation policies, and the institutional 
remnants of the old regime. Thus reparations were delivered quietly as pensions, whereas 
researchers in the 1980s and victims’ associations tackled the Francoist legacy in the 
public arena. 
 Under the impetus of regional left-leaning parties, the government was pressured 
to make amends for past repression. This followed a stable trajectory: pensions, 
restitution of union and party property, moral rehabilitation of victims, and finally 
reconciliation advancement, which tackled the institutional legacy of the regime and 
recognized victims’ right to knowledge, compensation and limited justice. Whereas 
economic concerns defined the reconciliation policy at the onset, memory recuperation 
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became more important at later stages, as retributive emotions no longer threatened the 
cohesion of the nation. 
 Despite the unprecedented achievements of the HML, the reconciliation effort is 
far from complete. A wholehearted rejection of Francoism is the challenge facing 
Spanish society. In practical terms, the government must ensure that all autonomies 
comply with the legal obligation to remove fascist symbols; it must take greater 
responsibility for the exhumation of mass graves; and it must annul the tribunal sentences 
of the regime. These actions are highly symbolic acts that would force the state to 
reevaluate its complicity with the old regime and ensure that it remains accountable to all 
its citizens. Yet a new generation of Spaniards, raised in democratic and European Spain, 
can ensure that the gradual process of reconciliation reaches its end. 
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Appendix A: Parliamentary initiatives adopted since the Transition.1 
 
Legend: PEN = widows, pensions and economic compensations; AMN = amnesty; RES = confiscated property restitution; ARCH = documents and archives; 
SIM = removal of symbols; MEM = historical memory recuperation and reparation; JUS = trials, sentences and justice 
 
Table 1: Parliamentary initiatives approved during the first legislature (1979-1982). 
 
TITLE DATE TYPE PURPOSE POLITICAL ACTOR OTHER 
PROPOSICIONES DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
23-03-1979 PEN RECONOCIMIENTO DE PENSIONES, ASISTENCIA MEDICO-
FARMACEUTICA Y ASISTENCIA SOCIAL A FAVOR DE LAS VIUDAS, 
HIJOS Y DEMÁS FAMILIARES DE LOS ESPAÑOLES FALLECIDOS EN 
LA GUERRA CIVIL. 
CONGRESS SOCIALISTS  
PROPOSICIONES DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
23-3-1979 PEN PENSIONES A LOS MUTILADOS EXCOMBATIENTES DE LA ZONA 
REPUBLICANA. 
CONGRESS 
COMMUNISTS 
 
 
PROPOSICIONES DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
21-06-1979 PEN MODIFICACION DEL REAL DECRETO-LEY 6/78, DE 6 DE MARZO, 
SOBRE SITUACION DE LOS MILITARES QUE INTERVINIERON EN LA 
GUERRA CIVIL. 
CATALONIAN 
SOCIALISTS IN 
CONGRESS 
 
PROPOSICIONES DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
23-03-1979 PEN CONCESION DE PENSIONES A LAS VIUDAS, PADRES Y 
HUÉRFANOS DE LOS COMBATIENTES DE LA REPUBLICA, MILICIAS 
POPULARES Y FUERZAS DE ORDEN PUBLICO. 
CONGRESS 
COMMUNISTS 
 
 
PROPOSICIONES DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
29-04-1981 PEN MODIFICACION PARCIAL DE LA LEY DE PENSIONES DE MUTILADOS 
DEL EJERCITO DE LA REPUBLICA. 
DEMOCRATIC 
COALITION 
 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY CONGRESO 
21-06-1979 PEN MUTILADO EJERCITO REPUBLICANO  CATALONIAN 
SOCIALISTS IN 
CONGRESS 
APPROVED 
UNANIMOUSLY 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY CONGRESO 
10-12-1981 PEN REAL DECRETO-LEY 6/1978, DE 6 DE MARZO, SOBRE SITUACION 
MILITARES QUE TOMARON PARTE EN LA GUERRA CIVIL. 
CATALONIAN 
SOCIALISTS IN 
CONGRESS 
APPROVED WITH 
AMENDMENT 
PROPOSICIONES DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
10-12-1981 AMN RECONOCIMIENTO COMO AÑOS TRABAJADOS A EFECTOS DE LA 
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL DE LOS PERIODOS DE PRISIÓN SUFRIDOS 
COMO CONSECUENCIA DE LOS SUPUESTOS CONTEMPLADOS EN 
LA LEY DE AMNISTIA, DE 15 DE OCTUBRE DE 1977. 
CONGRESS 
COMMUNISTS 
 
EXTENSION OF 
PREVIOUS LEG. 
 
                                                 
1
 Source for tables: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia, “Iniciativas parlamentarias relativas a la Guerra Civil y la Dictadura” (23 de junio de 
2006): Annexes 1-8. 
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Table 2: Parliamentary initiatives approved during the second legislature (1982-1986).  
 
TITLE DATE TYPE PURPOSE POLITICAL ACTOR OTHER 
PROPOSICION DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
20-12-1983 PEN DESAPARICION DISCRIMINACION EN EL TRATO QUE RECIBEN POR 
LA LEY 46/77 DE 15 DE OCTUBRE, LOS MILITARES PROFESIONALES 
DE LA REPUBLICA RESPECTO DE LOS FUNCIONARIOS CIVILES. 
CONGRESS SOCIALISTS  
PROPOSICION DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
20-12-1983 PEN RECONOCIMIENTO COMO AÑOS TRABAJADOS A EFECTOS DE LA 
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL DE LOS PERIODOS DE PRISION SUFRIDOS 
COMO CONSECUENCIA DE LOS SUPUESTOS CONTEMPLADOS EN 
LA LEY DE AMNISTIA, DE 15 DE OCTUBRE DE 1.977. 
CONGRESS SOCIALISTS  
PROPOSICION DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
20-12-1983 PEN RECONOCIMIENTO COMO AÑOS TRABAJADOS A EFECTOS DE LA 
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL DE LOS PERIODOS DE PRISION SUFRIDOS 
COMO CONSECUENCIA DE LOS SUPUESTOS CONTEMPLADOS EN 
LA LEY DE AMNISTIA. 
MIXED PARL. GROUP 
(Communist Party) 
 
PROPOSICION DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
25-05-1983 AMN ADICION DE UN NUEVO ARTICULO A LA LEY DE AMNISTIA: 
 
“Los interesados podrán solicitar la aplicación de la Ley de Amnistía 
incluso cuando haya habido resolución judicial que declare la inadmisión 
del proceso por prescripción de la acción.” (Allows interested parties to 
request the application of the Amnesty Law even when other judicial 
decisions prevent such action). 
MIXED PARL. GROUP 
(Communist Party) 
 
 
 
 
No debate or voting initiatives were approved during the third legislature (1986-1989).  
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Table 3: Parliamentary initiatives approved during the fourth legislature (1989-1993). 
 
TITLE DATE TYPE PURPOSE POLITICAL ACTOR OTHER 
MOCION ANTE EL PLENO 
DEL SENADO 
28-02-1990 ARCH DEVOLUCION A LA GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA DE LOS FONDOS 
PERTENECIENTES AL "COMISSARIAT DE PROPAGANDA" DE LA 
MISMA DURANTE LA GUERRA CIVIL, Y QUE EN 1939 FUERON 
CONFISCADOS Y TRASLADADOS A LA BIBLIOTECA NACIONAL. 
MIXED GROUP OF THE 
SENATE 
YES - CIU  
YES - BASQUE 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
ABS – POPULAR 
DECLARACION 
INSTITUCIONAL 
CONGRESO 
23-11-1990 SIM DECLARACION INSTITUCIONAL CON OCASION DEL 50 
ANIVERSARIO DEL FALLECIMIENTO DE DON MANUEL AZAÑA. 
  
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
25-02-1992 JUS INTERPOSICION, POR EL FISCAL DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, DE 
RECURSO DE REVISION CONTRA LA SENTENCIA DEL TRIBUNAL 
REGIONAL DE RESPONSABILIDADES POLITICAS DE 4 DE MAYO DE 
1940 EN EL EXPEDIENTE SEGUIDO CONTRA DON BLAS INFANTE 
PEREZ. 
MIXED GROUP OF THE 
SENATE 
APPROVED 
UNANIMOUSLY  
 
Table 4: Parliamentary initiatives approved during the fifth legislature (1993-1996). 
 
TITLE DATE TYPE PURPOSE POLITICAL ACTOR OTHER 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
26-09-1995 PEN REINTEGRO DE BIENES Y DERECHOS PATRIMONIALES, O EN SU 
CASO DE LA INDEMNIZACION ECONOMICA CORRESPONDIENTE, A 
LAS PERSONAS QUE SE VIERON PRIVADAS DE LOS MISMOS POR 
RAZONES POLITICO-SOCIALES EN VIRTUD DE UNA LEGISLACION 
EXCEPCIONAL EN LA GUERRA CIVIL. 
UNITED LEFT 
CATALAN 
BASQUE 
MIXED 
APPROVED 
UNANIMOUSLY 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
28-11-1995 PEN RECONOCIMIENTO DE LA NACIONALIDAD ESPAÑOLA POR CARTA 
DE NATURALEZA A LOS BRIGADISTAS INTERNACIONALES. 
UNITED LEFT 
BASQUE  
SOCIALISTS 
APPROVED 
UNANIMOUSLY 
MOCION 
CONSECUENCIA DE 
INTERPELACION 
06-04-1995 PEN CONTINUAR CON CARACTER DE URGENCIA LAS ACCIONES 
ENCAMINADAS A DAR SOLUCION A LA PROBLEMATICA PLANTEADA 
POR LOS LLAMADOS "NIÑOS DE LA GUERRA" ESPAÑOLES, QUE 
EMIGRARON O FUERON EVACUADOS A LA URSS ENTRE 1936 Y 
1942 POR LA GUERRA CIVIL ESPAÑOLA. 
MIXED APPROVED 
UNANIMOUSLY 
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Table 5: Parliamentary initiatives approved during the sixth legislature (1996-2000). 
 
TITLE DATE TYPE PURPOSE POLITICAL ACTOR OTHER 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
27-05-1997 PEN APLICACION DE LA LEY 37/1984, DE 22 DE OCTUBRE, A LAS 
ENFERMERAS REPUBLICANAS. 
SOCIALISTS YES - SOCIALISTS  
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - POPULAR 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
18-09-1996 DEV MEDIDAS PARA SOLUCIONAR EL PROBLEMA DE LA UBICACION DE 
LAS ORGANIZACIONES SINDICALES Y PATRONALES, CESIONARIAS 
DEL PATRIMONIO SINDICAL, SITAS EN LA CAPITAL DE GRANADA. 
UNITED LEFT YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - POPULAR 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
 
Amendment by PP 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
26-05-1998 DEV DEVOLUCION DE PROPIEDADES INCAUTADAS EN 1936 AL 
"CENTRO DE INSTRUCCION, PROTECCION Y RECREO" DE CERVAS-
ARES. 
MIXED YES - SOCIALISTS  
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - POPULAR 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
28-05-1996 ARCH DEVOLUCION A LA GENERALIDAD DE CATALUÑA DE LA 
DOCUMENTACION DEPOSITADA EN EL ARCHIVO HISTORICO DE 
SALAMANCA. 
MIXED YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - POPULAR 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - MIXED 
MOCION ANTE EL PLENO 
SENADO 
06-11-1996 ARCH ELABORAR LAS DISPOSICIONES REGLAMENTARIAS NECESARIAS 
PARA LA ACTUALIZACION Y UNIFICACION DE LA NORMATIVA QUE 
REGULA LOS EXPURGOS DE LOS JUZGADOS Y TRIBUNALES Y 
PARA EL ESTABLECIMIENTO DE LOS CRITERIOS O DIRECTRICES 
DE LOS MISMOS, GARANTIZANDO LA MAS IDONEA CONSERVACION 
DE CUANTOS DOCUMENTOS PUDIERAN TENER ALGUN VALOR 
CULTURAL, HISTORICO, JURIDICO O ADMINISTRATIVO. 
POPULAR PARTY 
 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - POPULAR 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - BASQUE 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
14-09-1999 SIM CONMEMORACION DEL 60 ANIVERSARIO DEL EXILIO ESPAÑOL 
OCASION DE LA FINALIZACION DE LA GUERRA CIVIL ESPAÑOLA. 
SOCIALISTS 
UNITED LEFT 
CATALAN 
BASQUE 
CANARIA 
MIXED 
YES - SOCIALISTS  
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - MIXED 
ABS - POPULAR 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
09-03-1999 JUS SOLICITUD DE CONSULTA PUBLICA DEL SUMARIO DEL CONSEJO 
DE GUERRA CONTRA LLUIS COMPANYS. 
 
(APROBADA CON ENMIENDA TRANSACCIONAL DE LOS GRUPOS 
MIXTO. SOCIALISTA Y CATALAN. 10 DIPUTADOS DEL GRUPO 
POPULAR VOTAN EN CONTRA EN T ANTO QUE 122 SE ABSTIENEN 
Y 3 VOTAN A FAVOR). 
MIXED (ERC) YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - CANARIA 
ABS - POPULAR 
YES - MIXED 
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Table 6: Parliamentary initiatives approved during the seventh legislature (2000-2004). 
 
TITLE DATE TYPE PURPOSE POLITICAL ACTOR OTHER 
MOCION URGENTE 
CONGRESO 
16-05-2001 MEM POLITICA NECESARIAS PARA LA REHABILITACION A TODOS LOS 
NIVELES DE LOS COMBATIENTES GUERRILLEROS ESPAÑOLES. 
UNITED LEFT 
 
YES - POPULAR 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - CANARIA 
YES - MIXED 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
20-11-2002 MEM RECONOCIMIENTO DE BLAS INFANTE COMO PADRE DE LA PATRIA 
ANDALUZA. 
MIXTO (Andalusian Party) YES - POPULAR 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - MIXED 
ROPOSICION NO DE LEY 
EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
24-10-2002 MEM RECONOCIMIENTO DEL HONOR Y DE LOS DERECHOS DE LOS 
PRESOS POLITICOS SOMETIDOS A TRABAJOS FORZADOS POR LA 
DICTADURA FRANQUISTA 
UNITED LEFT YES - POPULAR 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - BASQUE 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
20-11-2002 MEM DESARROLLO DE UNA POLITICA DE ESTADO PARA EL 
RECONOCIMIENTO DE LOS CIUDADANOS Y CIUDADANAS 
EXILIADOS. 
SOCIALISTS YES - POPULAR 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - MIXED 
 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
20-11-2002 MEM RECONOCIMIENTO MORAL A TODOS LOS HOMBRES Y MUJERES 
QUE PADECIERON LA REPRESION DEL REGIMEN FRANQUISTA 
POR DEFENDER LA LIBERTAD Y POR PROFESAR CONVICCIONES 
DEMOCRATICAS. 
UNITED LEFT YES - POPULAR 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - MIXED 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
20-11-2002 MEM REPARACION MORAL A LAS VICTIMAS DE LA GUERRA CIVIL 
DESAPARECIDAS Y ASESINADAS POR DEFENDER LOS VALORES 
REPUBLICANOS Y RECONOCIMIENTO DEL DERECHO DE LOS 
FAMILIARES Y HEREDEROS A RECUPERAR SUS RESTOS, NOMBRE 
Y DIGNIDAD. 
SOCIALISTS YES - POPULAR 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - MIXED 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
20-11-2002 MEM DEVOLUCION DE LA DIGNIDAD A LOS FAMILIARES DE LOS 
FUSILADOS DURANTE EL FRANQUISMO 
MIXED (Basque Solidarity-
EA) 
YES - POPULAR 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - MIXED 
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Table 7: Parliamentary initiatives approved during the eighth legislature (2004-2008). 
 
 
Table 7 continued on next page.
TITLE DATE TYPE PURPOSE POLITICAL ACTOR OTHER 
PROYECTO DE LEY 18-03-2005 PCV LEY 3/2005, DE 18 DE MARZO, POR LA QUE SE RECONOCE UNA 
PRESTACIÓN ECONOMICA A LOS CIUDADANOS DE ORIGE 
ESPAÑOL DESPLAZADOS AL EXTRANJERO, DURANTE SU MINORIA 
DE EDAD, COMO CONSECUENCIA DE LA GUERRA CIVIL, Y QUE 
DESARROLLARON LA MAYOR PARTE DE SU VIDA FUERA DEL 
TERRITORIO NACIONAL. 
THE GOVERNMENT Approved with 318 
votes 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
01-06-2004 PCV RECONOCIMIENTO DE LAS VICTIMAS DE LA GUERRA CIVIL Y DEL 
FRANQUISMO. 
 
 
SOCIALISTS YES - SOCIALISTS  
YES - CATALAN 
YES - ERC 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - CANARIA 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - MIXED  
ABS - POPULAR 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
06-04-2005 PCV MODIFICACION DE LA LEY DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA DE 
LAS PERSONAS FISICAS, AL OBJETO DE EXIMIR DE TRIBUTACION 
LA TOT ALIDAD DE INDEMNIZACIONES PERCIBIDAS POR LOS 
CONTRIBUYENTES COMO CONSECUENCIA DE HABER SUFRIDO 
PRIVACION DE LIBERTAD EN LOS SUPUESTOS PREVISTOS EN LA 
LEY DE AMNISTIA. 
CATALAN  
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
06-04-2005 PCV EXENCION DEL PAGO DEL IMPUESTO SOBRE LA RENTA DE LAS 
PERSONAS FISICAS A LOS EX-PRESOS POLITICOS ACOGIDOS A LA 
LEY 46/1977, DE AMNISTIA, QUE NO CUMPLIAN CON LOS 
REQUISITOS DE LA DISPOSICION ADICIONAL 18a DE LA LEY 4/1990, 
DE PRESUPUESTOS GENERALES DEL ESTADO. 
UNITED LEFT 
 
 
REAL DECRETO LEY 
13/2005, 
28-10-2005 RES REAL DECRETO LEY 13/2005, DE 28 DE OCTUBRE, POR EL QUE SE 
MODIFICA LA LEY 4/1986, DE 8 DE ENERO, DE CESION DE BIENES 
DEL PATRIMONIO SINDICAL ACUMULADO. 
THE GOVERNMENT Ratified 
PROYECTO DE LEY 17-11-2005 ARCH LEY 21/2005, DE 17 DE NOVIEMBRE, DE RESTITUCION A LA 
GENERALIDAD DE CATALUÑA DE LOS DOCUMENTOS INCAUTADOS 
CON MOTIVO DE LA GUERRA CIVIL CUSTODIADOS EN EL ARCHIVO 
GENERAL DE LA GUERRA CIVIL ESPAÑOLA Y DE CREACIÓN DEL 
CENTRO DOCUMENTAL DE LA MEMORIA HISTORICA. 
THE GOVERNMENT Approved with 193 
votes in favor and 
134 against from all 
groups, except PP 
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Table 7 continued on next page.
      
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
18-05-2004 ARCH PROCESO DE DIALOGO CON EL GOBIERNO DE LA GENERALIDAD 
DE CATALUÑA, CON EL FIN DE ALCANZAR UN ACUERDO QUE 
PERMITA RESOLVER EL CONTENCIOSO PLANTEADO EN RELACION 
CON LA DOCUMENTACION INCAUTADA QUE EN LA ACTUALIDAD SE 
HALLA RECOGIDA EN EL ARCHIVO GENERAL DE LA GUERRA CIVIL 
DE SALAMANCA. 
SOCIALISTS 
ERC 
UNITED LEFT 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - ERC 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - CANARIA 
YES - MIXED 
NO - POPULAR 
ABS - CATALAN 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
10-11-2004 ARCH MEDIDAS ENCAMINADAS A LA CONSERVACION Y CATALOGACION 
EN LOS ARCHIVOS CIVILES Y MILITARES DE LOS EXPEDIENTES Y 
SUMARIOS INSTRUIDOS CONTRA LOS REPRESALIADOS DE LA 
GUERRA CIVIL ESPAÑOLA. 
ERC 
 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - ERC  
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - MIXED 
ABS - POPULAR 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
18-05-2005 ARCH TRASPASO A LA GENERALIDAD DE CATALUÑA DE LOS FONDOS DE 
LA GENERALIDAD REPUBLICANA LOCALIZADOS EN LA BIBLIOTECA 
DEL INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE EDUCACION FISICA (INEF) DE 
MADRID. 
CATALAN YES - SOCIALISTS  
YES - CATALAN 
YES - ERC 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - BASQUE 
ABS - POPULAR 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
18-05-2005 ARCH CONDENA DEL EXPOLIO BIBLIOGRAFICO PADECIDO POR LA 
COMISARIA DE EDUCACION FISICA Y DEPORTES DE LA 
GENERALIDAD DE CATALUÑA A MANOS DEL GOBIERNO DEL 
GENERAL FRANCO. 
ERC 
 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - ERC 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - BASQUE 
ABS - POPULAR 
MOCION ANTE 
COMISION SENADO 
29-03-2006 ARCH GESTIONES OPORTUNAS ANTE EL PATRONATO DEL MUSEO 
NACIONAL CENTRO DE ARTE REINA SOFIA PARA GARANTIZAR LA 
CONSERVACION Y ULTERIOR TRASLADO DE LA OBRA "GERNICA", 
DE PABLO PICASSO, PARA SU EXPOSICION TEMPORAL EN UNO DE 
LOS MUSEOS DE LA COMUNIDAD AUTONOMA DEL PAIS VASCO. 
MIXED IN SENATE 
 
YES - MIXED  
YES - POPULAR 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - ENTESA  
NO - SOCIALISTS 
 
PROPOSICION DE LEY 
GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
07-02-2006 MEM DECLARACION DEL AÑO 2006 COMO AÑO DE LA MEMORIA 
HISTORICA. 
UNITED LEFT 
 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - ERC  
YES - VASCO 
Various - CANARIA 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - MIXED 
NO - POPULAR 
  
62
 
 
Table 7 continued on next page.
      
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
03-11-2004 SIM RETIRADA INMEDIATA DE LOS SIMBOLOS DE LA DICTADURA 
FRANQUISTA DE LOS EDIFICIOS PUBLICOS DEL ESTADO DONDE 
AUN PERSISTEN. 
ERC YES - SOCIALISTS  
YES - ERC 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
ABS - POPULAR 
YES - CATALAN 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY EN COMISION 
CONGRESO 
03-11-2004 SIM RETIRADA DE SIMBOLOS DE LA DICTADURA FRANQUISTA DE LOS 
EDIFICIOS PUBLICOS DEL ESTADO. 
UNITED LEFT YES - SOCIALISTS  
YES - ERC 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
ABS - POPULAR 
YES - CATALAN 
MOCION ANTE 
COMISION SENADO 
11-04-2005 SIM RECUERDO DEL 60 ANIVERSARIO DE LA ELECCION DE DIEGO 
MARTINEZ BARRIOS COMO PRESIDENTE INTERINO DE LA 
REPUBLICA ESPAÑOLA, TRAS LA DIMISION Y FALLECIMIENTO DE 
MANUEL AZAÑA. 
BASQUE IN SENATE 
 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - MIXED  
YES - CANARIA 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - ENTESA CAT 
NO - POPULAR 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
28-02-2006 SIM ADOPCION DE MEDIDAS RELATIVAS A ALEXANDRE BOVEDA 
IGLESIAS, VICTIMA DEL REGIMEN FRANQUISTA EN GALICIA. 
MIXED YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - ERC 
YES - BASQUE  
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - CANARIA 
YES - MIXED 
ABS - POPULAR 
PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
28-09-2004 JUS ANULACION DEL CONSEJO DE GUERRA SUMARISIMO A QUE FUE 
SOMETIDO EL PRESIDENTE DE CATALUÑA LLUIS COMPANYS. 
ERC YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - ERC 
YES - BASQUE  
YES - UNITED LEFT 
Various - CANARIA 
YES - MIXED 
ABS - POPULAR 
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PROPOSICION NO DE 
LEY ANTE EL PLENO 
CONGRESO 
27-09-2005 JUS MEDIDAS PARA LA ANULACION DEL CONSEJO DE GUERRA 
SUMARISIMO A QUE FUE SOMETIDO MANUEL CARRASCO I 
FORMIGUERA 
CATALAN YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - POPULAR 
YES- CATALAN 
YES - ERC 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - CANARIA 
YES - MIXTO 
LEY 24/2006, GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
08-07-2006 MEM DECLARACION DEL AÑO 2006 COMO AÑO DE LA MEMORIA 
HISTORICA 
UNITED LEFT (IU-ICV) 
 
Amendments by PSOE 
and CiU 
YES - SOCIALISTS 
YES - CATALAN 
YES - BASQUE 
YES - UNITED LEFT 
YES - CANARIA 
ABS - ERC 
NO - POPULAR 
 
LEY 52/2007, GRUPOS 
PARLAMENTARIOS 
CONGRESO 
26-12-2007 MEM LEY 52/2007 POR LA QUE SE RECONOCEN Y AMPLIAN DERECHOS 
Y SE ESTABLECEN MEDIDAS EN FAVOR DE QUIENES PADECIERON 
PERSECUCION O VIOLENCIA DURANTE LA GUERRA CIVIL Y LA 
DICTADURA 
Socialists (PSOE), 
partnered with United Left 
(IU-ICV), Basque-PNV, 
Mixed, Galician Nationalist 
Bloque-BNG, Aragonese 
Council-Chunta 
Aragonesa, Canaria, 
Basque Solidairty-EA and 
Navarra Yes- NB 
NO - POPULAR 
NO - ERC 
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Table 8: Government measures that regulate the implementation of Law 52/2007. 
 
 
Table 8 continued on next page.
REAL DECRETO 
1803/2008 
3-11-2008 PEN REAL DECRETO POR EL QUE SE REGULAN LAS CONDICIONES Y EL 
PROCEDIMIENTO PARA EL ABONO DE LAS INDEMNIZACIONES 
RECONOCIDAS EN LA LEY 52/2007 A FAVOR DE PERSONAS 
FALLECIDAS O CON LESIONES POR SU ACTIVIDAD EN DEFENSA 
DE LA DEMOCRACIA 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE  
ORDEN CUL/3190/2008 7-11-2008 SIM POR LA QUE SE DICTAN INSTRUCCIONES PARA LA RETIRADA DE 
SIMBOLOS FRANQUISTAS EN LOS BIENES DE LA ADMINSTRACION 
GENERAL DEL ESTADO Y SUS ORGANISMOS PUBLICOS 
DEPENDIENTES 
MINISTERIO DE 
CULTURA 
 
RESOLUCION DE 24 DE 
JULIO DE 2008 
30-7-2008 MEM POR LA QUE SE PUBLICA LA CONCECION DE SUBVENCIONES 
DESTINADAS A ACTIVIDADES RELACIONADAS CON LAS VICTIMAS 
DE LA GUERRA CIVIL Y DEL FRANQUISMO 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA 
 
REAL DECRETO 
1791/2008 
17-11-2008 JUS SOBRE LA REGULACION DEL PROCEDIMIENTO PARA LA 
OBTENCION DE LA DECLARACION DE REPARACION Y 
RECONOCIMIENTO PERSONAL A QUIENES PADECIERON 
PERSECUCION O VIOLENCIA DURANTE LA GUERRA CIVIL Y LA 
DICTADURA 
MINISTERIO DE 
JUSTICIA 
 
REAL DECRETO 
1792/2008 
17-11-2008 PEN SOBRE LA CONCESION DE LA NACIONALIDAD ESPAÑOLA A LOS 
VOLUNTARIOS INTEGRANTES DE LA BRIGADAS 
INTERNACIONALES; EXIME DEL REQUISITO DE LA RENUNCIA A LA 
ANTERIOR NACIONALIDAD AL COLECTIVO INTEGRADO POR LAS 
BRIGADAS INTERNACIONALES 
MINISTERIO DE 
JUSTICIA 
 
INSTRUCCION DE 4 DE 
NOVIEMBRE DE 2008 
26-11-2008 ARCH SOBRE ACCESO A LA CONSULTA DE LOS LIBROS DE 
DEFUNCIONES DE LOS REGISTROS CIVILES, DICTADA EN 
DESARROLLO DE LA DISPOCION ADICIONAL OCTAVA DE LA LEY 
52/2007 
LA DIRECTORA 
GENERAL DE LOS 
REGISTROS Y DEL 
NOTARIADO, PILAR 
BLANCO-MORALES 
LIMONES 
 
INSTRUCCION DE 4 DE 
NOVIEMBRE DE 2008 
26-11-2008 PEN SOBRE EL DERECHO DE OPCION A LA NACIONALIDAD ESPAÑOLA 
DE ORIGEN PARA LAS PERSONAS CUYO PADRE O MADRE 
HUBIERA SIDO ORIGINARIAMENTE ESPAÑOL Y PARA LOS NIETOS 
DE QUIENES PERDIERON O TUVIERON QUE RENUNCIAR A LA 
NACIONALIDAD ESPAÑOLA COMO CONSECUENCIA DE EXILIO 
MINISTERIO DE 
JUSTICIA 
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Source: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia, op.cit., Anexo 8.; Boletín Official del Estado. 
 
 
 
      
MODIFICACION DEL ART. 
33 DEL TEXTO 
REFUNDIDO DE LA LEY 
DE CLASES PASIVAS 
24-12-2008 PEN ACTUALIZACIÓN DE LA CUANTIA DE LA PRESTACION ECONÓMICA 
A LOS CIUDADANOS DE ORIGEN ESPAÑOL DESPLAZADOS AL 
EXTRANJERO. INDEMINZACIÓN A “EX” PRESOS SOCIALES 
HOMOSEXUALES 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA 
 
ORDEN PRE/3749/2008, 
DE 22 DE DICIEMBRE 
24-12-2008 MEM POR LA QUE SE DA PUBLICIDAD AL ACUERDO DE CONSEJO DE 
MINISTROS SOBRE LA CREACION DE LA OFICINA PARA LAS 
VICTIMAS DE LA GUERRA CIVIL Y DE LA DICTADURA 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA 
 
RESOLUCION DE 27 DE 
NOVIEMBRE DE 2009 
2-12-2009 MEM POR LA QUE SE PUBLICA LA CONCESION DE SUBVENCIONES 
DESTINADAS A ACTIVIDADES RELACIONADAS CON LAS VICTIMAS 
DE LA GUERRA CIVIL Y DEL FRANQUISMO 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA 
 
ORDEN CUL/459/2009 28-2-2009 SIM POR LA QUE SE CREA Y REGULA LA COMISION TECNICA DE 
EXPERTOS PARA LA VALORACION DE LOS SUPUESTOS 
DETERMINANTES DE LA EXCEPCIONALIDAD EN LA RETIRADA DE 
SIMBOLOS 
MINISTERIO DE 
CULTURA 
 
REAL DECRETO 710/2009 30-4-2009 PEN POR EL QUE SE DESARROLLAN LAS PREVISIONES DE LA LEY 
2/2008, DE 23 DE DICIEMBRE, DE PRESUPUESTOS GENERALES DEL 
ESTADO PARA 2009, EN MATERIA DE PENSIONES DE CLASES 
PASIVAS Y DE DETERMINADAS INDEMNIZACIONES SOCIALES 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA 
 
OREDEN PRE/1743/2009 6-6-2009 PEN POR LA QUE SE AMPLIA EL PLAZO DE CONCESION DE 
SUBVENCIONES DESTINADAS A ACTIVIDADES RELACIONADAS 
CON LAS VICTIMAS DE LA GUERRA CIVIL Y DEL FRANQUISMO 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA 
 
REAL DECRETO 
2143/2008 
10-11-2009 ARCH POR EL QUE SE REGULA EL PROCEDIMIENTO A SEGUIR PARA LA 
RESTITUCION A PARTICULARES DE LOS DOCUMENTOS 
INCAUTADOS CON MOTIVO DE LA GUERRA CIVIL 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
CULTURA 
 
RESOLUCION DE 17 DE 
MARZO DE 2010 
24-3-2010 PEN SE AMPLIA UN AÑO EL PLAZO PARA EJERCER EL DERECHO DE 
OPTAR A LA NACIONALIDAD ESPAÑOLA RECOGIDO EN LA 
DISPOCION ADICIONAL SEPTIMA DE LA LEY 52/2007 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA 
 
ORDEN PRE/786/2010 29-3-2010 MEM POR LA QUE SE ESTANLECEN LAS BASES REGULADORAS Y SE 
EFECTUA LA CONVOCATORIA PARA LA CONCESION DE 
SUBVENCIONES DESTINADAS A ACTIVIDADES RELACIONADAS 
CON LAS VICTIMAS DE LA GUERRA CIVIL Y DEL FRANQUISMO 
MINISTERIO DE LA 
PRESIDENCIA 
 
REAL DECRETO 
1816/2009 
15-11-2010 ARCH POR EL QUE SE APRUEBA EL REGLAMENTO DE LOS ARCHIVOS 
JUDICIALES MILITARES 
MINISTERIO DE 
DEFENSA 
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Appendix B: Reconciliation initiatives by type and affiliation.1 
 
 
FIRST LEGISLATURE (1979-82) 
 
Table 1: Initiatives brought before the first legislature. 
 
INITIATIVES PROPOSICIONES DE LEY CONGRESO 
PROPOSICIONES 
DE LEY SENADO 
PROPOSICIONES 
NO DE LEY 
CONGRESO 
MOCIONES 
SENADO 
PRESENTED 11 2 4 1 
APPROVED 6 - 2 - 
REJECTED - 1 - 1 
NOT DEBATED 5 1 2 - 
 
Table 2: Number of initiatives, categorized by the political affiliation. 
 
 
INITIATIVES 
 
 
GROUP SOCIALISTS OF 
CATALONIA GROUP COMMUNISTS GROUP SOCIALISTS 
PRESENTED 6 4 3 
APPROVED 3 2 1 
REJECTED - - - 
NOT DEBATED 3 2 2 
  
SECOND LEGISLATURE (1982-86) 
 
Table 3: Initiatives brought before the second legislature 
 
INITIATIVES* PENSIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPENSATIONS 
RETURN OF SEIZED 
PROPERTY AMNESTY 
PRESENTED 6 2 2 
APPROVED 3 - 1 
REJECTED - - 1 
NOT DEBATED 3 2 - 
*All initiatives were “Proposiciones de ley del Congreso”. 
 
THIRD LEGISLATURE (1986-89) 
 
Table 4: Initiatives brought before the third legislature. (None were successful). 
 
INITIATIVES PROPOSICIONES DE LEY CONGRESO 
PROPOSICIONES 
NO DE LEY 
CONGRESO 
PETICIONES DE 
CREACIÓN DE 
COMISIONES DE 
INVESTIGACIÓN 
MOCIONES 
SENADO 
PRESENTED 6 3 2 1 
APPROVED - - - - 
REJECTED 6 3 1 - 
NOT DEBATED - - 1 1 
 
                                                 
1
 Source for tables: Ministerio de la Presidencia, “Iniciativas parlamentarias relativas a la Guerra Civil y la 
Dictadura” (23 de junio de 2006) 
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FOURTH LEGISLATURE (1989-93) 
 
Table 5: Initiatives brought before the fourth legislature, categorized by type. 
 
INITIATIVES 
PROPOSICIONES 
DE LEY 
CONGRESO 
PROPOSICONES 
NO DE LEY 
CONGRESO 
PROPUESTAS 
RESOLUCIÓN 
DECLARACIÓN 
INSTITUTIONA
L 
MOCIONES 
SENADO 
PRESENTED 2 2 2 1 1 
APPROVED - 1 - 1 1 
REJECTED 2 1 2 - - 
NOT DEBATED - - - - - 
 
FIFTH LEGISLATURE (1993-96) 
 
Table 6: Initiatives brought before the fifth legislature. 
 
INITIATIVES PROPOSICIONES DE LEY CONGRESO 
PROPOSICIONES NO DE 
LEY CONGRESO MOCIONES SENADO 
PRESENTED 2 5 3 
APPROVED - 2 1 
REJECTED 1 2 1 
NOT DEBATED 1 1 1 
 
SIXTH LEGISLATURE (1996-00) 
 
Table 7: Initiatives brought before the sixth legislature. 
 
INITIATIVES PROPOSICIONES DE LEY CONGRESO 
PROPOSICIONES NO DE 
LEY CONGRESO MOCIONES SENADO 
PRESENTED 2 16 2 
APPROVED - 6 1 
REJECTED - 2 - 
NOT DEBATED 2 8 1 
 
Table 8: Initiatives brought before the sixth legislature, categorized by political affiliation. 
 
GROUPS PRESENTED APPROVED REJECTED NOT DEBATED 
SOCIALISTS 2 1 - 1 
MIXED 8 3 1 4 
CATALAN 3 - - 3 
UNITED LEFT 4 1 - 3 
PEOPLE’S PARTY 1 1 1 - 
SOCIALISTS, UNITED 
LEFT, CATALAN, 
BASQUE, CANARIAN 
COALITION AND 
MIXED 
1 1 - - 
 
SEVENTH LEGISLATURE (2000-04) 
 
Table 9: Initiatives brought before the seventh legislature, categorized by type. 
 
INITIATIVES 
PROPOSICIONES 
DE LEY 
CONGRESO 
PROPOSICIONES 
NO DE LEY 
CONGRESO 
MOCIÓN 
URGENTE 
CONGRESO 
SOLICITUD 
CREACION 
COMISIONES NO 
PERMANENTES 
MOCIONES 
SENADO 
PRESENTED 3 42 3 3 3 
APPROVED - 6 1 - - 
REJECTED 2 9 1 1 2 
NOT DEBATED 1 27 1 2 1 
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Table 10: Initiatives brought before the seventh legislature, categorized by political affiliation. 
 
GROUPS PRESENTED APPROVED REJECTED NOT DEBATED 
SOCIALISTS 4 2 2 - 
PEOPLE’S PARTY - - - - 
CATALAN 6 - 3 3 
UNITED LEFT 18 3 4 11 
MIXED 20 2 3 15 
BASQUE 1 - 1 - 
SOCIALISTS, 
CATALAN, BASQUE, 
CANARIAN 
COALITION AND 
MIXED 
2 - 1 1 
SOCIALISTS, UNITED 
LEFT, CATALAN, 
BASQUE, CANARIAN 
COALITION AND 
MIXED 
1 - 1 - 
UNITED LEFT AND 
MIXED 2 - - 2 
 
Table 11: Topics of initiatives brought before the seventh legislature, categorized by political affiliation. 
 
TOPICS G. SOCIALISTS G. MIXED G. CATALAN G. BASQUE G. UNITED LEFT 
Pensions and 
economic 
compensations 
1 2 1 - 7 
Return of confiscated 
property - 1 2 - - 
Return of documents 
and archives - 5 3 - - 
Acts of recognition 
and moral reparation 
of victims 
2 12 - 1 10 
Trials and sentences 1 - - - 1 
TOTAL 3 20 6 1 18 
 
 
EIGHTH LEGISLATURE (02/04/2004-23/06/2006) 
 
Table 12: Initiatives brought before the eighth legislature, categorized by type. 
 
INITIATIVES 
PROPOSICIONES 
DE LEY 
CONGRESO 
PROPOSICIONES 
NO DE LEY 
CONGRESO Y 
MOCIONES 
MOCIONES 
SENADO 
COMISION 
SOLICITUD 
CREACIÓN 
COMISIONES 
NO 
PERMANENTES 
CONGRESO 
SOLICITUD 
CREACIÓN 
SUBCOMISIONES 
Y PONENCIAS 
CONGRESO 
PRESENTED 9 66 4 1 1 
APPROVED 1 15 2 - - 
REJECTED 2 4 - 1 - 
RETIRADAS 1 9 - - - 
NO 
DEBATAIDAS 5 38 2 - 1 
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Table 13: Initiatives brought before the eight legislature, categorized by political affiliation. 
 
GROUPS PRESENTED APPROVED REJECTED WITHDRAWN NOT DEBATED 
SOCIALISTS 4 2 - - 2 
PEOPLE’S PARTY 4 - 2 - 2 
CATALAN 5 3 1 - 1 
REPUBLICAN 
LEFT OF 
CATALONIA 
25 5 1 2 17 
BASQUE 4 1 1 1 1 
MIXED 10 2 - 2 6 
UNITED LEFT 24 3 1 4 16 
SOCIALISTS, ERC, 
UNITED LEFT 1 1 - - - 
ERC, IUNITED 
LEFT AND MIXED 1 - 1 - - 
ERC, UNITED 
LEFT, BASQUE 
AND MIXED 
1 - 1 - - 
CATALAN 
AGREEMENT OF 
PROGRESS 
1 - - - 1 
BASQUE 
NATIONALIST 
SENATORS 
1 1 - - - 
TOTAL: 81 18 8 9 46 
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Appendix C: Questions raised in Parliament.1 
 
Legend: QUE = plenum questions; CON = written questions in congress; SEN = written questions in 
senate; COM = testimonies (comparecencias) 
 
 
FIRST LEGISLATURE (1979-82) 
 
Table 1: Questions raised before the 1st legislature, categorized by branch and status. 
TOPIC TYPE FINALIZED WITHDRAWN REJECTED EXPIRED 
WIDOWS, PENSIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPENSATIONS 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
4 
15 
24 
1 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
4 
3 
RETURN OF CONFISCATED PROPERTY QUE 
CON 
SEN 
 
2 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
AMNESTY, LEGALIZATION AND 
RECOGNITION 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
 
1 
1 
1 
  
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
TRIALS AND SENTENCES CON 
SEN 
 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
TOTAL  50 1 1 8 
 
SECOND LEGISLATURE (1982-86) 
 
Table 2: Questions raised before the 2nd legislature, categorized by branch and status. 
TOPIC TYPE FINALIZED WITHDRAWN REJECTED EXPIRED 
WIDOWS, PENSIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPENSATIONS 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
2 
4 
3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
RETURN OF CONFISCATED PROPERTY INT 
CON 
 
1 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
AMNESTY, LEGALIZATION AND 
RECOGNITION 
INT 
 
1 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
FLAGS AND SYMBOLS SEN 
 
1 - - - 
TOTAL  13 0 0 0 
                                                 
1
 Source: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia, “Iniciativas parlamentarias relativas a la 
Guerra Civil y la Dictadura” (23 de junio de 2006): Annexes 1-8. 
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FOURTH LEGISLATURE (1989-93) 
 
Table 3: Questions raised before the 4th legislature, categorized by branch and status. 
TOPIC TYPE FINALIZED WITHDRAWN REJECTED EXPIRED 
WIDOWS, PENSIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPENSATIONS 
COM 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
3 
6 
70 
13 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2 
3 
RETURN OF CONFISCATED PROPERTY 
 
COM 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
 
1 
3 
11 
15 
- 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
DOCUMENTS AND ARCHIVES SEN 
 
2 - - - 
FLAGS, ACTS OF RECOGNITION AND 
REMOVAL OF SYMBOLS 
QUE 
CON 
1 
5 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
TOTAL  130 2 1 6 
 
FIFTH LEGISLATURE (1993-96) 
 
Table 4: Questions raised before the 5th legislature, categorized by branch and status. 
TOPIC TYPE FINALIZED WITHDRAWN REJECTED EXPIRED 
WIDOWS, PENSIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPENSATIONS 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
 
3 
8 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
10 
1 
RETURN OF CONFISCATED PROPERTY 
 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
1 
5 
1 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
DOCUMENTS AND ARCHIVES QUE 
CON 
2 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
TRIALS AND SENTENCES CON - - - 2 
TOTAL  24 0 1 14 
 
SIXTH LEGISLATURE (1996-00) 
 
Table 5: Questions raised before the 6th legislature, categorized by branch and status. 
TOPIC TYPE FINALIZED WITHDRAWN REJECTED EXPIRED 
WIDOWS, PENSIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPENSATIONS 
CON 
SEN 
 
12 
4 
- 
- 
- 
- 
5 
1 
RETURN OF CONFISCATED PROPERTY 
 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
2 
13 
9 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
1 
DOCUMENTS AND ARCHIVES QUE 
CON 
SEN 
2 
9 
7 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
3 
1 
FLAGS, ACTS OF RECOGNITION AND 
REMOVAL OF SYMBOLS 
COM 
QUE 
CON 
1 
2 
3 
 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1 
TRIALS AND SENTENCES CON 2 - - - 
TOTAL  66 1 0 14 
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SEVENTH LEGISLATURE (2000-04) 
 
Table 6: Questions raised before the 7th legislature, categorized by branch and status. 
TOPIC TYPE FINALIZED WITHDRAWN REJECTED EXPIRED 
WIDOWS, PENSIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPENSATIONS 
CON 
SEN 
 
18 
3 
1 
- 
- 
- 
1 
- 
RETURN OF CONFISCATED PROPERTY 
 
CON 
SEN 
16 
3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
DOCUMENTS AND ARCHIVES COM 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
1 
4 
9 
7 
- 
3 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
FLAGS, ACTS OF RECOGNITION AND 
REMOVAL OF SYMBOLS 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
5 
12 
6 
 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
TOTAL  84 5 0 1 
 
EIGHTH LEGISLATURE (02/04/2004-23/06/2006) 
 
Table 7: Questions raised before the 8th legislature, categorized by branch and status. 
TOPIC TYPE FINALIZED WITHDRAWN REJECTED EXPIRED 
WIDOWS, PENSIONS AND ECONOMIC 
COMPENSATIONS 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
 
1 
2 
- 
- 
1 
- 
- 
- 
2 
- 
- 
- 
RETURN OF CONFISCATED PROPERTY 
 
CON 
 
1 - - - 
DOCUMENTS AND ARCHIVES COM 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
12 
12 
46 
14 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
FLAGS, ACTS OF RECOGNITION AND 
REMOVAL OF SYMBOLS 
QUE 
CON 
SEN 
5 
17 
7 
2 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
TRIALS AND SENTENCES CON 2 - - - 
TOTAL  119 3 2 0 
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Appendix D: Pensions and Reparation for Political Imprisonment. 
 
Table 1: Social Security fees paid by the Treasury during 1979-2005 as a result of prison time as directed 
by Law 46/1977 and Law 18/1984.1 
 
YEAR: NUMBER OF 
BENEFICIARIES: 
AMOUNT 
AWARDED: 
1979 99 € 47,746.67 
1980 908 € 1,116,722.57 
1981 500 € 648,441.67 
1982 672 € 996,895.02 
1983 133 € 211,446.70 
1984 207 € 384,944.71 
1985 528 € 188,160.21 
1986 554 € 597,109.37 
1987 328 € 263,361.55 
1988 203 € 248,928.72 
1989 115 € 93,036.29 
1990 82 € 82,038,54 
1991 155 € 143,944.17 
1992 63 € 3,508.99 
1993 32 € 17,132.29 
1994 17 € 9,719.67 
1995 13 € 9,848.14 
1996 12 € 35,402.09 
1997 14 € 3,937.21 
1998 6 € 1,119.85 
1999 35 € 13,385.14 
2000 10 € 2,474.46 
2001 16 € 6,895.48 
2002 4 € 1,067.15 
2003 8 € 3,411.16 
2004 13 € 6,956.14 
2005 7 € 2,711.86 
TOTAL 4,734 € 5,140,345.82 
Source: Comisión Interministerial 2006, 49. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In the original Spanish version, the table is labeled as “El número de beneficiarios (4.734) y las cuantías 
(€5,1 millones) ingresadas por la Dirección General del Tesoro en concepto de cuotas en la cuenta de la 
Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social durante el período 1979 – 2005 en aplicación de las Leyes 
46/1977, de 15 de octubre, y 18/1984.” 
  74
Table 2: Analysis of 2006 economic reparations given as a result prison time as directed by Law 46/1977 
and Law 18/1984. 
 
 
Applications 
submitted: 
 
103,000 
Applications 
recognized: 
 
60,479 (58.71%) 
Total amount: 
 
€ 391,000,000 
 
Basis for 
rejection:2 
38,094 (92.5%) 
1,034 (2.5%) 
683 (1.7%) 
421 (1%) 
930 (2.3%) 
did not meet 3 year minimum requirement 
did not meet beneficiary requirements 
jailed for non-political offense 
did not meet age requirement 
various combination of above reasons 
Source: Comisión Interministerial 2006, 50. 
 
Table 3: Beneficiaries of war pensions for 2006. 
 
GROUPS: ORIGINAL 
BENEFICIARIES: 
CURRENT 
BENEFICIARIES: 
Civil servants 49,000 n/a 
Professional military 60,000 3,251 
 
Relatives of professional military 13,787 
Non-professional military 140,000 10,180 
Relatives of non-professional military 31,929 
Deceased or disappeared 110,000 20,558 
Ex-combatant invalids 55,000 3,918 
Relatives of ex-combatant invalids 40,000 6,545 
Civilian invalids 59,000 5,048 
Relatives of civilian invalids  727 
TOTAL 513,000 95,943 
Source: Comisión Interministerial 2006, 58. 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The age requirement and the 3-year minimum requirement were amended after the passing of the 
Historical Memory Law, allowing for further compensations. 
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Appendix E: Grants and beneficiaries of reconciliation funding. 
 
 
Table 1: Beneficiary entities in the period 2006-2010.1 
 
Entity 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Associations 36 61 66 94 113 
Foundations 10 18 22 33 40 
Family Groups 3 5 10 14 21 
Unions - 1 3 4 6 
Universities - - - - 13 
TOTAL 49 85 101 145 193 
Source: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia 2011, “Datos por entidad.” 
 
 
Table 2: Grants made in the period 2006-2010, categorized by amount. 
 
Domain 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
Archives and 
Censuses 
394,882.58 435,132.72 376,423.70 263,206.93 684,371.35 2,154,017.28 
Documentaries 138,440.00 275,278.00 478,985.00 450,484.20 388,810.46 1,731,997.66 
Commemoration 507,524.93 259,502.00 118,000.00 71,456.57 128,058.58 1,084,542.08 
Studies 50,000.00 139,000.00 82,881.05 153,588.96 366,096.19 791,566.20 
Exhibitions 158,013.34 270,012.00 323,170.00 229,000.00 287,589.30 1,267,784.64 
Graves 725,175.01 549,673.10 1,070,595.31 1,397,405.28 2,175,457.34 5,918,306.04 
Tributes 190,000.00 64,180.00 223,570.00 44,136.80 186,199.00 708,085.80 
Journals 207,455.00 312,135.13 295,552.60 273,815.74 198,709.25 1,287,667.72 
Others 154,500.00 88,759.00 120,450.00 140,500.00 245,700.08 749,909.08 
Publications 88,600.00 146,250.00 273,260.00 311,405.50 307,952.00 1,127,467.50 
Testimonies 385,409.14 477,063.00 545,112.08 535,000.00 712,056.45 2,654,640.67 
TOTAL 3,000,000.00 
 
3,016,984.95 
 
3,907,999.74 
 
3,869,999.98 
 
5,681,000.00 
 
19,475,984.67 
 
Source: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia 2011, “Datos por presupuesto.”2 
 
 
 
Table 3: Grants made in the period 2006-2010, categorized by domain. 
 
Domain 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
Archives and 
Censuses 10 11 13 10 26 70 
Documentaries 4 9 12 17 14 56 
Commemoration 15 8 4 3 6 36 
Studies 1 3 3 8 14 29 
Exhibitions 5 6 11 10 12 44 
Graves 19 18 25 36 52 150 
Tributes 4 3 10 3 7 27 
Journals 12 10 10 14 10 56 
Others 4 2 5 6 8 25 
Publications 4 8 10 18 14 54 
Testimonies 14 13 18 20 30 95 
TOTAL 92 91 121 145 193 642 
Source: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia 2011, “Datos por presupuesto.” 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 In the period 2006-2010, there were a total of 576 beneficiaries. Yet 295 were unique recipients that 
received funding for more than one project. 
2
 In the original document, the calculation of the totals is erroneous. It is corrected in my table. 
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Table 4: Grants made in the period 2006-2010, categorized by beneficiary entities. 
 
Domain Associations Foundations Family Groups Unions Universities TOTAL 
Archives and 
Censuses 34 12 - 3 3 52 
Documentaries 35 6 - 1 - 42 
Commemoration 24 2 - - - 26 
Studies 16 4 - 1 6 27 
Exhibitions 22 11 - 2 - 35 
Graves 46 4 40 - 1 91 
Tributes 11 10 - - - 21 
Journals 29 9 - - - 38 
Others 14 4 - -  18 
Publications 35 10 - - 1 46 
Testimonies 42 18 - 2 3 65 
TOTAL 308 90 40 9 14 461 
Source: Self-made with data from Ministerio de la Presidencia 2011, “Datos por entidad.”3 
 
 
                                                 
3
 In the original document, the calculation of the totals is erroneous. It is corrected in my table. 
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